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The last decade witnessed an explosion of activity in the field of corporate
takeovers, which ended in an environment of increased regulation of these
transactions. These events have prompted extensive study into the causes for
takeovers and the effects of their regulation. This article surveys and analyzes
both the economic literature and the law in an attempt to determine which
regulatory regimes make the most sense in light of the empirical evidence.
Though no single theory is sufficient to explain all takeovers, the empirical
evidence is most consistent with explanations of takeovers as value-maximizing
events for target firm shareholders that enhance social efficiency. Economic
learning and public policy, however, have not marched in step. Influenced by
unsubstantiated fears and suspicions, often raised by managers, about the
impact of takeovers on third parties, regulation in the United States has tended
to thwart and burden takeovers as if they were non-value-maximizing wealth
transfers. The author concludes that an informed reading of the literature
suggests that much of the existing regulatory apparatus is unwarranted.
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Introduction
There is a voluminous economic literature seeking to explain takeovers.
There is also substantial regulation. This article relates the one to the other, and
is a guide to both. It reviews the economic literature in order to facilitate an
evaluation of the efficacy of current regulation. The premise is that if some
explanations of takeovers are more plausible than others, then certain regulatory
regimes make more sense than others. I refer to explanations in the plural
because we do not have a comprehensive theory of takeovers. Different theories
do well at explaining various subsets of acquisitions, but no theory satisfactorily
explains all.
The empirical evidence is most consistent with value-maximizing, effi-
ciency-based explanations of takeovers. Yet the thrust of regulation is to thwart
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and burden takeovers, as if they were non-value-maximizing wealth transfers.
The sharp discrepancy between the economic understanding of takeovers and
the output of the political process in this area is a function of two factors. First,
the public is largely uninformed about and uninterested in takeovers.' Takeover
regulation is therefore low salience legislation for most voters, and interest
groups are consequently able to exercise significant influence on legislators in
this area. Second, there are asymmetric organizational advantages across the
interest groups most affected by takeovers that favor those whom takeovers
potentially harm, managers, over those whom takeovers benefit, shareholders.
Managers are easier to coordinate across firms than shareholders, and they have
more to lose.2 The organizational advantage is important because lobbyists play
a significant role in educating legislators,3 and intuition is often at odds with
the economic learning.4 Under such circumstances, legislators are likely to be
woefully misinformed concerning the probable effects of takeovers-their
education is incomplete and distorted-and predisposed to regulate.
This article seeks to ease the informational problem for legislators and
policymakers, as it provides a nontechnical analysis and synthesis of the
scholarship on takeovers and their regulation.5 The current lull in takeover
activity makes this an ideal time for a retrospective evaluation, as we can reflect
upon what the frenzied, often dizzying and breath-taking, pace of dealmaking
in the 1980s produced. The effort should also prove useful for evaluating other
countries' takeover regulation, such as the proposed European Community (EC)
framework. However, because markets and institutional arrangements differ
1. Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L.
REV. 457, 491 (1988).
2. Managers already interact through interlocking boards and trade associations. While institutional
investors may organize, their associations are less likely to be self-sustaining as they can provide less private
information or benefits to members than a business trade organization. See id. at 468-69. See generally
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 144-47 (1971). This asymmetry is exacerbated at
the state level because a target's managers reside in the legislating state and are politically well-connected,
whereas its shareholders are dispersed across many states and thus not part of the local voting constituency.
Finally, individuals are more likely to engage in collective action to avoid a public "bad", than to obtain
a public good. RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 82-83 (1982). This tendency favors managers, who
are seeking to avoid job loss, as against shareholders, who obtain a higher stock price. in addition, Roe
contends that federal regulation of the financial services industry should be understood as an effort to
eliminate effective monitoring (hence disciplining) of corporate managers by preventing concentration of
ownership in the most capable shareholders, financial institutions. Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of
American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991).
3. WILuAM K. MUIR, LEGISLATURE: CALIFORNIA'S SCHOOL FOR POLITICS (1982).
4. See Romano, supra note 1, at 495-97.
5. For an earlier article in a similar spirit see John C. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate
Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1145 (1984).
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substantially across the United States and Europe, lessons from the U.S.
experience must be drawn with care.
6
The article proceeds as follows: in the first Part, I classify and review the
numerous explanations that have been proposed for takeovers and related
transactions, in conjunction with the empirical research that sheds light on the
plausibility, or power, of the explanations. In the second Part, I consider the
implications of the economic literature for the current patchwork of takeover
regulation. I conclude that an informed reading of the literature suggests that
much of the regulatory apparatus is unwarranted.
I. Theories of Takeovers and Related Transactions
One important, and undisputed, datum about acquisitive transactions should
be noted from the outset: acquisitions generate substantial gains to target
company shareholders. All studies find that target firms experience statistically
significant positive stock price responses to the announcement of takeover
attempts or merger agreements.7 On average, there is a 20% increase over the
pre-announcement market price for mergers and a 30% increase for tender
offers in the period around the takeover announcement.8 Abnormal returns in
going-private transactions (leveraged buyouts) are of similar magnitude, ranging
across studies between 20% and 37%.1 Without question, the announcement
of a bid is good news for target shareholders. The different explanations of
6. Wright, Robbie and Thompson contend that financial markets ("buyout markets") are less developed
in parts of Europe, as compared to the United States. These deficiencies make leveraged buyout transactions
by management or other investors unavailable as a competitive response to a takeover in those countries.
Mike Wright, Ken Robbie & Steve Thompson, Corporate Restructuring, Buy-Outs, and Managerial Equity:
The European Dimension, 3 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1991, at 47-48. They also note that European
buyouts involve corporations that are family-dominated or otherwise closely-held, unlike most American
firms. This means that hostile takeovers will be a less frequently employed device for control changes than
friendly acquisitions. Furthermore, U.S. financial institutions' owneiship of equity in manufacturing
companies is restricted, which makes takeovers more important as a mechanism for disciplining management
in the United States than in countries, such as Germany, where there are no such restrictions. Id., at 50-52.
7. Most of the studies referred to throughout this article are "event studies," which use standard
statistical techniques to test whether firms' stock returns at the time of an event, such as the announcement
of a bid, are significantly different from their expected returns. The difference is referred to as an average
residual or abnormal return. A statistically significant abnormal return represents the market's valuation
of the event (its impact on shareholder wealth). For a review of the methodology see Stephen J. Brown
& Jerold B. Warner, Using Daily Stock Returns, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1985).
8. Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley & Jeffry M. Netter, The Market for Corporate Control: The
Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1988, at 49; Michael C. Jensen & Richard S.
Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, II J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983).
9. Steven N. Kaplan, Sources of Value in Management Buyouts, in LEVERAGED MANAGEMENT
BUYoUTs: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 95 (Yakov Amihud ed., 1989); Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen,
Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions, 44 J. FIN. 771 (1989); Laurentius
Marais, Katherine Schipper & Abbie Smith, Wealth Effects of Going Private for Senior Securities, 23 J.
FIN. ECON. 155 (1989).
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acquisitions that will be examined are efforts at explaining the source of these
gains.
The data are more ambiguous, however, concerning acquiring firms' returns.
Depending on the sample and time period, acquirers experience positive,
negative, or zero abnormal returns on a bid's announcement and completion.
From the acquirer's perspective, there are two classes of explanations or
motivations for a takeover: value-maximizing and non-value-maximizing ones.
Value-maximizing explanations view takeovers as undertaken in order to
increase the equity share price of the acquiring firm. Non-value-maximizing
explanations consider takeovers in diametrically opposite terms, as transactions
that maximize managers' utility rather than shareholder wealth. These two
explanations therefore predict a different stock price reaction, positive and
negative, respectively.
Value-maximizing explanations can be subdivided into efficiency, expro-
priation (wealth transfer), and market inefficiency explanations. This division
is pivotal for policy analysis, but has no differential impact on the acquirer's
expected return from the transaction. It will be positive in each case. Each non-
value-maximizing explanation can be characterized as a distinct expropriation
story, in which wealth is transferred from the acquiring firm's shareholders to
the target firm (as well as to the managers). These transactions will thus have
a negative stock price effect. To preview the classification schema, see
Table 1.
There are, however, theoretically plausible reasons for not finding positive
abnormal returns to bidders even when acquisitions are value-maximizing
transactions. First, acquiring firms are typically much larger than target firms,
making it more difficult to measure abnormal returns.' 0 Second, a bid may
reveal information about the bidding firm unrelated to the particular acquisition,
confounding the stock price effect." Third, if the takeover market is competi-
10. Where the target is a very small fraction of the bidder's value, the acquisition is unlikely to have
any measurable impact on the bidder's stock price. Asquith, Bruner and Mullins find significantly greater
positive abnormal returns for acquirers of larger targets, and Jarrell and Poulsen find that acquirers' abnormal
returns increase significantly as the target increases in size relative to the acquirer. Paul Asquith, Robert
F. Bruner & David W. Mullins, The Gains to Bidding Firms from Merger, II J. FIN. ECON. 121 (1983);
Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, The Returns to Acquiring Firms in Tender Offers: Evidence from
Three Decades, 18 FIN. MGMT. 12 (1989).
11. The unrelated information concerning the bidder could cut both ways: a bid may signal that the
bidding firm has done better than expected, with cash flows high enough to make a bid ("good news"),
or it may signal that the managers are going to use cash to chase a resisting target for which they might
overpay ("bad news"). Studies that find that bidders' returns vary significantly with the consideration the
bidder uses for the acquisition have been interpreted as evidence of a signaling effect. When bidders use
stock instead of cash, researchers find a negative price effect; the interpretation is that when a bidder thinks
its stock is overvalued, it uses stock rather than cash for the acquisition and the market, understanding the
signal, reacts accordingly. See Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment
Decisions when Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1984);
Nickolaos Travlos, Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding Firms' Stock Returns, 42
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tive, then bidders will earn only normal returns, as abnormal profits are com-
peted away. Finally, for acquiring firms that have an active mergers and
acquisitions program, the gain from a specific acquisition may have been
anticipated in the bidder's stock price at the time the mergers and acquisitions
program was announced. 2
Despite these interpretative subtleties concerning acquirers' stock price
reactions, one may draw some generalizations from the data. The price move-
ment for acquirers is small in percentage terms and less statistically significant
than that for target firms. In addition, acquirers' returns have decreased over
time and, in the 1980s, may have been negative. 3 Moreover, even when
acquirers earn negative returns, when their losses are aggregated with the
targets' gains, acquisitions still net a positive abnormal return.' 4 Thus, because
the division of the gain is skewed toward targets, takeovers that appear to be
non-value-maximizing transactions for bidders may be socially beneficial (that
is, aggregate wealth increases). 5
Studies of the performance of target firms after acquisition also shed light
on whether acquisitions are value-maximizing or non-value-maximizing transac-
tions. Here, stock price data are less reliable indicators for, as the interval over
which the price is examined increases, changes can no longer be readily
attributed to the event in question (the takeover) because it will be confounded
with other events.'6 Most of these studies therefore use accounting data to
determine long-term changes in performance. As with event studies of the
announcement effects on acquirers, the ex-post performance findings are also
J. FIN. 943 (1987).
12. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 L., ECON., &
ORO. 225 (1985); Katherine Schipper & Rex Thompson, Evidence on the Capitalized Value of Merger
Activity for Acquiring Firms, 11 J. FIN. EcoN. 85 (1983).
13. Bradley, Desai and Kim find significantly negative abnormal returns to bidders in the 1980s whereas
Jarrell and Poulsen find bidders' returns are insignificantly negative over the same years. Michael Bradley,
Anand Desai & E. Han Kim, Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and their Division between
the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1988); Jarrell & Poulsen, supra note
10. Both studies find bidders' returns in the 1960s and 1970s were significantly positive. In addition,
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny find that the returns to acquirers making diversifying acquisitions in the 1980s
are negative (as opposed to 1980s acquisitions of firms in related lines of business, and as opposed to
diversifying acquisitions in the 1960s). Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Do Manageri-
alMotives Drive BadAcquisitions?, 45 J. FIN. 31 (1990). These studies may, however, underestimate bidder
returns as they necessarily exclude privately-held bidders (i.e., leveraged-buyout firms), whose transactions
throughout the 1970s and at least the early 1980s were extremely profitable.
14. See, e.g., Bradley et al., supra note 13; STEVEN KAPLAN & MICHAEL S. WEISBACH, THE SUCCESS
OF AcQuIsITIONS: EVIDENCE FROM DIESTITURES (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
No. 3484, 1990).
15. They would not be socially beneficial if the increase in wealth is due to a wealth transfer rather
than an efficiency gain.
16. For a further discussion of problems with using ex-post stock price data, see Ellen Magenheim &
Dennis Mueller, Are Acquiring-Firm Shareholders Better Off After an Acquisition?, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS
& TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 171 (John C. Coffee et al. eds., 1988).
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mixed. While earlier studies find no operating improvements in merged firms,
more recent sophisticated studies find that performance improves
post-merger.17
One difficulty in assessing post-merger performance is in determining the
appropriate comparison, which entails constructing a counterfactual bench-
mark-what the two firms' performances would have been had they not
merged. In an important paper, Jarrell compares post-merger performance to
analysts' pre-merger forecasts of the firms' performance.' 8 She finds that five
years post-merger, the merged firms perform significantly better (9%) than the
benchmark, although one to two years immediately after the merger the perfor-
mance was worse than the benchmark. The capital market also accurately
anticipates long-term performance: using regression analysis, Jarrell finds that
the abnormal stock price effects upon a bid's announcement are significantly
positively related to the merged firm's subsequent profitability. These data
indicate that acquisitions are, indeed, value-maximizing, for the long-term
performance of the combined firms improved. They also suggest that negative
findings of earlier studies are, in all likelihood, the product of failure to use an
appropriate benchmark. 9
A. Value-Maximizing Efficiency Explanations
There are two efficiency explanations of takeovers: to realize synergy gains
and to reduce agency costs.
1. Synergy Gains
One value-maximizing efficiency explanation of takeovers is to achieve
synergy gains: the value of the combined firm is greater than the value of the
17. Compare Edward S. Herman & Louis Lowenstein, The Efficiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers, in
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER, supra note 16, at 211 and
D. RAVENSCRAFT & F. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELLOFFS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY (1987) with Paul M.
Healy, Krishna G. Palepu & Richard S. Ruback, Does Corporate Performance Improve After Mergers?
(1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) and Sherry L. Jarrell, Do Takeovers Generate
Value? Evidence on the Capital Market's Ability to Assess Takeovers (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the author).
18. Jarrell, supra note 17. The performance measure is the ratio of net income to sales. The perfor-
mance forecasts were made before any information on a bid was known. Jarrell constructs a control
portfolio of firms, matched by size and industry, which did not engage in a merger, and tests for the
difference between the merged firms and control firms' difference between forecasted performance and
actual performance.
19. Id. at 39. Healy, Palepu, and Ruback, supra note 17, also construct a pre-merger performance
benchmark to measure post-merger performance and find that profitability improves. In addition, both
Healy, Palepu and Ruback and Jarrell, supra note 17, adjust post-merger earnings for changes in accounting
methods and acquisition financing. The studies that find profitability deteriorates post-merger, see supra
note 17, do not make such adjustments, and their results are, accordingly, less reliable.
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two firms (target and acquirer) separately. The increased value may be generat-
ed by real operating efficiencies, or it may be due to financial synergies.
a. Operating Efficiencies
Examples of operating synergistic gains are economies of scale (fixed costs
are spread over a larger volume of production), and economies of scope
(complementary resources are combined, such as a merger between a firm with
a unique product and another with the sales organization to market it). Another
potential operating synergy involves differential managerial ability. The acquir-
ing firm's managers may be good at managing but have excess capacity (they
can efficiently manage more than the assets of their firm). The firm can use
these excess managerial resources by acquiring a firm that is less efficiently
managed due to shortages of managerial resources, and the combination will
thereby produce a synergy gain.2" This story assumes that managerial skills
are indivisible, a product of a team, and further, that management teams are
not available for acquisition by contract. The thesis is that good managers must
develop firm-specific knowledge, and that under a contractual arrangement, the
managers' capital could be appropriated by the target firm. Accordingly, to
ensure that the management team receives a share of the quasi-rents it produces,
its compensation is taken through "ownership" of the target's management (by
acquiring the target).2
The synergy explanation implies that: (1) the returns to bidders and targets
will be positively correlated, as synergy prevents a bidding competition that
would reduce the correlation in returns to zero because the merging firms are
a uniquely valuable match;2 (2) takeovers will be more valuable when there
are size differentials as economies of scale are attainable; and (3) takeovers will
be more valuable when economies of scope as well as economies of scale are
present. There is evidence that supports these predictions. Weston, Chung, and
Hoag find that the correlation between bidder and target stock returns in pure
conglomerate and product-extension mergers, which are likely to produce
economies of scope, from combining managerial skills or complementary
20. J. FRED WESTON, KWANG S. CHUNG & SUsAN E. HOAG, MERGERS, RESTRUCTURING AND CORPO-
RATE CONTROL 93-94, 191-92 (1990).
21. A quasi-rent is the excess value of an asset over its next best use; here, the manager is worth more
running the particular firm than in other employment. The difference between this differential managerial
ability explanation of takeovers and the replacement of inefficient management explanation, see discussion
infra Part l.A.2.a, is that the acquirer's management in the synergy explanation seeks to complement the
target's management, having experience in the line of business, so it explains horizontal mergers, whereas
the inefficient management explanation is applicable to any acquisition. WESTON ET AL., supra note 20,
at 192-93.
22. Id. at 266.
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resources, as well as financial synergy, is significantly positive." Hawawini
and Swary find that among bidders, small banks experience higher abnormal
returns from mergers than large banks, and that the smaller the target bank in
relation to the bidder, the higher the target's abnormal returns. 2 Finally,
acquisitions of firms in related businesses, where gains from economies of scale
and scope are most likely, are extremely profitable: acquisitions of unrelated
companies in the 1980s produced lower returns than related-firm acquisi-
tions;2 5 and a significant portion of the gains from hostile takeovers are due
to reallocation of target assets to related acquirers.26
b. Financial Synergy
An historically popular explanation of merger activity that falls in the
financial synergy category was the availability of certain accounting methods
for acquisitions. Because the pooling method of accounting for an acquisition
reports higher accounting earnings for the combined entity than the purchase
method (the part of the premium attributable to intangibles--goodwill--is not
recognized, and hence not amortized, under pooling), its use was thought to
increase the value of a transaction. The availability of the pooling method was
therefore viewed as a motive for many mergers. Belief in the power of this
explanation led to restrictions on use of the pooling method under the Account-
ing Principles Board's Opinions 16 and 17.27
Accounting-based financial synergy is, however, a spurious example of
synergy because the choice of accounting method has no impact on the com-
bined firm's cash flow. It could explain mergers, then, only if the market was
fooled by the convention. Studies show, however, that the market sees through
the accounting conventions to the firms' economic earnings. 28 In addition,
Opinions 16 and 17 had no significant impact on acquirer stock prices. 29 These
23. Id. at 267-68. See discussion of financial synergy infra Part I.A.I.b.
24. GABRIEL A. HAWAWINI & ITZHAK SWARY, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE U.S. BANKING
INDUSTRY: EVIDENCE FROM THE CAPrrAL MARKETS 130-35 (1990). The finding that small banks experience
higher abnormal returns than large ones may, however, be a purely technical phenomenon: abnormal returns
are more likely to show up for small rather than large firms because any given gain will represent a larger
percentage of firm value. See supra text accompanying note 10.
25, Morck et aL, supra note 13.
26. Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return
to Corporate Specialization, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1990 1,
55 (Martin N. Bailey & Clifford Winston eds., 1990).
27. RONALD J. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 267 (1986).
28. Hai Hong, Robert S. Kaplan & Gershon Mandelker, Pooling vs. Purchase: The Effects ofAccount-
ing for Mergers on Stock Prices, 53 ACCT. REV. 31 (1978).
29. Katherine Schipper & Rex Thompson, The Impact of Merger-Related Regulations on the Sharehold-
ers of Acquiring Firms, 21 J. ACcr. RESEARCH 184 (1983). A potential real effect of Opinions 16 and 17
is to make debt covenants more binding where lending agreements depend on accounting numbers for
reported income. Leftwich finds some evidence of an effect (negative abnormal returns are significantly
127
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data demonstrate conclusively that accounting-based financial synergy did not
motivate takeovers.
A more plausible explanation of takeovers involving financial synergy is
that takeovers reduce the cost of capital. Three distinct finance theories are
implicated: (1) the risk of bankruptcy is reduced if firms' cash flows are not
perfectly positively correlated; (2) the steadier income stream of the merged
firms ensures and improves the usage of the firms' tax shields; and (3) there
is a cost differential between internal and external funds. For expositional
purposes, discussion of the first will be deferred to Part I.D.1, diversification
explanations of takeovers, and of the second, to Part I.B.1, tax-based explana-
tions of takeovers.
Capital costs are higher when funds are raised externally-flotation and
transaction costs are reduced if spread over a larger issue, and eliminated if the
merged firm's cash flow is sufficient to produce all necessary cash internally. 30
An acquisition is, correspondingly, a way to redeploy capital efficiently across
low and high growth firms. Organizational changes in the 1960s enabled
corporate managers to efficiently allocate funds internally to more needy
divisions, and this new organizational form's efficient properties were logically
extended through acquisitions to create the conglomerate firm.3' There is an
additional, tax-related explanation of cost of capital synergy. Because of the
two-tier corporate tax and differential personal tax rates on dividend and capital
gain income, firms have an incentive to use retained earnings that are not
subject to the dividend taxes to finance projects whose returns are lower than
the marginal cost of capital were they to be financed externally. 32 A merger
between an internally financing firm and an externally financing one can
redirect the former's unprofitable expenditures to the higher return projects that
the latter firm was financing externally.33
Some empirical evidence is consistent with this explanation. Markham found
that after conglomerate acquisitions, capital expenditure planning was shifted
related to the degree of private debt leverage and debt callability), Richard Leftwich, Evidence on the Impact
of Mandatory Changes in Accounting Principles on Corporate Loan Agreements, 3 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3
(1981), but Schipper and Thompson, supra, do not find any effect, or any significant cross-sectional
variation. Of course, a debt contract effect does not provide evidence on the issue of importance here,
whether the purchase/pooling choice motivated acquisitions.
30. WESTON ET AL., supra note 20, at 97-98, 197.
31. Oliver E: Williamson, The Modem Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. EcoN. Lrr.
1537 (1981).
32. Ronald Masulis & Brett Trueman, Corporate Investment and Dividend Decisions under Differential
Personal Taxation, 23 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 369 (1988). Although capital gains have been
taxed at the same rate as ordinary income since 1986, because they are deferred until the stock is sold, the
tax rate is still lower for this source of investment income.
33. Id. at 381-82. This explanation is consistent with Jensen's free cash flow thesis as applied to
acquirers. See discussion infra Part I.D.3.
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to the firm's corporate headquarters, but other managerial functions were not.34
Nielsen and Melicher find higher premiums are paid when the acquirer's cash
flow rate is higher than the target's, and Weston, Chung, and Hoag interpret
this as evidence of redeployment of capital from acquiring to acquired firm
industries.35 They also regard Markham's finding of large increases in capital
outlays after acquisitions as consistent with financial synergy because it implies
that the acquirers' investment opportunities improved with the takeover.36
2. Reducing Agency Costs
A reduction in agency costs is the other efficiency explanation for takeovers.
Corporate law is concerned with principal-agent problems, the alignment of
managers' incentives with shareholders' interests. A takeover is, in this frame-
work, a backstop remedy when other corporate governance devices that monitor
performance, such as the board of directors, fail at effective incentive-align-
ment.37
a. Replacement of Inefficient Management
The most important agency cost explanation of takeovers is that they reduce
managerial slack by replacing inefficient management. Manne put forth this
view in a classic article over 20 years ago, and it is one of the central insights
in corporate law scholarship.3" Manne maintained that takeovers are the market
for corporate control's key mechanism for disciplining managers because, unlike
mergers, which require the approval of the target firm's board, the takeover
bypasses target management and goes directly to the target shareholders for
approval. Takeovers accordingly keep the capital market competitive, and
constrain managers to work in the shareholders' interest.
A number of studies provide support for this explanation. For example,
acquired firms earn low rates of return prior to mergers and acquiring com-
34. JESSE W. MARKHAM, CONGLOMERATE ENTERPRISES AND PUBLIC POLICY (1973). 1 consider this
evidence of financial rather than operating (differential managerial ability) synergy because the latter source
of gain implies that all managerial functions would be transferred.
35. James F. Nielsen & Ronald W. Melicher, A Financial Analysis of Acquisition and Merger
Premiums, 8 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 139 (1973), discussed in WESTON et al., supra note 20,
at 197.
36. WESTON et al., supra note 20, at 198.
37. For example, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny find that top management is more likely to turn over
by board action when the firm's performance is poor relative to its industry, but not when the firm's industry
is itself doing poorly. Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Alternative Mechanisms for
Corporate Control, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 842 (1989). In the latter setting, they find that top management
changes through hostile takeovers.
38. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
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panies are above average in profitability. 9 Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny find
that targets of hostile takeovers, in which managers are more likely to be
replaced, are poor performers, as measured by low Tobin's q ratios, compared
to targets of friendly acquisitions.' Moreover, target firms have, on average,
low q ratios, and the gains from takeovers increase when bidders with high q
ratios acquire targets with low q ratios.4 Finally, Mitchell and Lehn find that
bad bidders make good targets: firms that experience negative abnormal returns
from acquisitions are more likely to be acquired than firms that do not.42
These studies all indicate that takeovers discipline management, because they
are focused on firms with poor performance.
In addition, management turnover is much higher after a takeover than it
is when there is no change in control or when firms engage in a friendly
merger.43 Most importantly, Martin and McConnell find that takeover targets
whose managers are replaced earned negative abnormal returns before the
takeover, as measured against their industry, while targets whose managers are
retained earned positive abnormal returns. 4 Of course, turnover does not
necessarily indicate that the departing managers are of poorer quality than their
replacements. But if we did not observe turnover at the top after takeovers, and
if such turnover was unrelated to the targets' performance, then the inefficient
management explanation would be in serious jeopardy.
Finally, there is evidence that after mergers, firms' cash flows improve as
a result of increased asset productivity. 45 Because the cash flow improvements
do not differ across related and unrelated-firm acquisitions, the gains do not
appear to come from the realization of operating synergies. This finding
suggests that acquirers are better able to manage target assets. I therefore
39. Paul Asquith, Merger Bids, Uncertainty and Shareholder Returns, 11 1. FIN. ECON. 51 (1983);
James C. Ellen, Mergers, Antitrust Law Enforcement, and Stockholder Returns, 31 J. FIN. 715 (1976).
40. Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and
Friendly Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 101 (Alan J. Auerbach ed.,
1988). Tobin's q is the ratio of a firm's market value to the replacement cost of its physical assets. It thus
measures the firm's intangible assets-goodwill, future growth opportunities, quality of management. As
Servaes puts it, Tobin's q "measures the market's assessment of the value of the assets in place and ...
future investment opportunities [and a]s such it is a measure of managerial performance." Henri Servaes,
Tobin's Q, Agency Costs and Corporate Control 1 (1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
A low q (q < 1) indicates poor performance.
41. Larry H. P. Lang, Rend Stulz & Ralph A. Walkling, Managerial Performance, Tobin's q, and the
Gains from Successful Tender Offers, 24 J. FIN. EcON. 137 (1989); Henri Servaes, Tobin's Q and the Gains
from Takeovers, 46 J. FIN. 409 (1991).
42. Mark L. Mitchell & Kenneth Lehn, Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?, 98 J. POL. ECON.
372 (1990).
43. Eugene P.H. Furtado & Vijay Karan, Causes, Consequences, and the Shareholder Wealth Effects
of Management Turnover: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, 19 FIN. MGMT. 60 (1990); James P. Walsh,
Top Management Turnover Following Mergers and Acquisitions, 9 STRATEGIC MOMT. J. 173 (1988).
. 44. Kenneth J. Martin & John J. McConnell, Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and
Management Turnover, 46 J. FIN. 671 (1991).
45. See Healy et al., supra note 17.
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consider it to be consistent with the inefficient management explanation of
takeovers.
The inefficient management explanation cannot, however, explain all
restructuring transactions. It cannot, for example, explain acquisitions in which
the acquirer retains incumbent management, a pattern that appears to have been
common in large acquisitions by conglomerate firms." In particular, it cannot
explain management-led leveraged buyouts (MBOs), because in these transac-
tions top management is part of the acquiring group and stays on the job.
However, even in these transactions, there are often subsequent management
changes .47
b. Free Cash Flow
An alternative explanation that views takeovers as a mechanism for reducing
agency costs but does not predict management's replacement is Jensen's "free
cash flow" theory." Jensen contends that a cause of takeover activity, espe-
cially in the petroleum industry, is the agency cost associated with the conflict
between managers and shareholders over the payout of free cash flow. Free
cash flow is cash flow in excess of the amount required to fund all of the firm's
projects that have a positive net present value. If these funds are paid out to
shareholders, managers will have fewer resources under their control, and will
thus be unable to waste cash by investing in projects with negative net present
values. In addition, eliminating free cash flow subjects managers to capital
market monitoring when they need to finance new projects, further constraining
their ability to undertake negative net present value transactions.
This explanation stands the financial synergy (reduction of the cost of
capital) explanation on its head, both because it is the target and not the
acquiring firm with excess cash, and because external financing is deemed
preferable to internal financing, due to incentive problems. But in contrast to
the other efficiency explanations, an acquiring firm is not needed to realize this
operating improvement. Incumbent managers can eliminate free cash flow on
their own through a financial restructuring, which increases the firm's leverage
and pays the borrowed cash out to the shareholders. Synergy gains, by defini-
46. MARKHAM, supra note 34.
47. The majority buyer in a leveraged buyout often replaces the retained incumbent management within
a year or so of the MBO. See, e.g., Roberts v. General Instrument Corp., Civ. No. 11639 (Del. Ch. Aug.
1990) (3 of 5 Forstmann-Little buyout firms canvassed by defendant had new, i.e., non-incumbent, chief
executive officers). In addition, 12% of the firms in Smith's sample of MBOs replaced a chief executive
officer under age 65 within 2 years of the buyout. Abbie J. Smith, Corporate Ownership Structure and
Performance: The Case of Management Buyouts, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 162 (1990). These data suggest that
MBOs may well be driven by Manne's explanation.
48. Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS &
TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER, supra note 16, at 314.
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tion, require two firms,49 and replacing inefficient management requires a
change in the management team. Hence, of the explanations analyzed thus far,
only free cash flow explains an increase in value from a defensive restructuring,
as well as from a takeover.
The free cash flow theory of takeovers provides a non-tax explanation for
why debt increases upon an acquisition. Issuing debt restricts future free cash
flows because, unlike dividends on stock, interest must be paid to avoid the
bankruptcy trigger of default. The leveraged acquisition or going-private
transaction is thus a credible commitment to eliminate free cash flow. It
increases the firm's value by mitigating the agency cost from the misuse of
excess cash.
Lehn and Poulsen educed support for the free cash flow explanation from
a study of going-private transactions: they found that the likelihood of firms
going private was directly related to the size of their free cash flows and the
threat of a hostile takeover (the reason why management is willing to forego
free cash flows), and inversely related to growth (that is, firms tended to be
taken private when there were no reinvestment opportunities for the cash).50
They also found that the magnitude of the premium in these cases was signifi-
cantly positively related to the magnitude of the firms' undistributed cash flows.
In addition, target firms have low Tobin's q ratios,5 which suggests that they
are firms with excess cash.52 Finally, managers perceive elimination of free
cash flow as a takeover motive. Pound finds that firms choosing to be covered
by Pennsylvania's restrictive takeover statute have significantly lower cash flow
valuation ratios, though not lower cash flow, than firms opting out of the
statute's coverage. 53 His interpretation is that managers who fear a takeover
(those who did not opt out of the statute) are successful at generating cash from
current assets but likely to misuse the funds (that is, their firms are free cash
flow acquisition targets) because the low valuation ratio conveys the market's
distrust of how management will use the cash.'
49. There can be synergy gains in a leveraged buyout, to the extent that the buyout (financing) group
brings valuable excess managerial skills to the target firm.
50. Lehn & Poulsen, supra note 9.
51. Lang et al., supra note 41; Servaes, supra note 41.
52. Servaes argues that Tobin's q ratio can be interpreted as a measure of agency costs because a low
q is evidence of overinvestment, which may be viewed as a source of free cash flow. Servaes, supra note
40. He finds that the target firms in his sample, in addition to their low q ratios, have lower dividend
payouts and lower debt levels than other firms in their industry, which suggests that they have more free
cash flow because they pay out less to their security holders. They also have lower capital expenditures
as a percent of assets, which implies that they have poor investment opportunities.
53. John Pound, On the Motives for Choosing a Corporate Governance Structure, (1990) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
54. Id. at 14.
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c. Improved Incentives from Ownership Changes in MBOs
There is, of course, a simpler agency cost reduction explanation for MBOs
than eliminating free cash flows. In an MBO, management's ownership share
dramatically increases. By making management a substantial stockowner, the
MBO provides powerful incentives to increase productivity. This is, in fact, a
classical approach to mitigating the principal-agent problem that is used quite
commonly, but on a smaller scale, in stock-based incentive compensation
plans.55
The explanation of MBO gains as a result of improved incentives from
increased ownership is consistent with the substantial evidence, reviewed in
Smith, that post-buyout firms experience significant operating efficiencies and
productivity improvements. 6 Wright, Robbie, and Thompson's study of United
Kingdom MBO firms that subsequently went public provides important addi-
tional support: they find that abnormal returns, measuring the firms' increased
value post-buyout, vary directly with management's equity ownership.57 Fin-
ally, Lichtenberg and Siegel find significant improvements in productivity occur
after MBOs.58 Of course, this explanation of takeovers is limited because it
applies solely to one type of acquisitive transaction, MBOs.
B. Value-Maximizing Expropriation Explanations
Expropriation explanations of takeovers focus on four distinct groups:
taxpayers, bondholders, employees, and consumers.
1. Tax Benefits
Tax benefits provide another value-maximizing explanation for takeovers.
Because interest is deductible, this is a more obvious explanation for leveraged
acquisitions than the monitoring story of free cash flows: the increased debt
load shelters more income, motivating the transaction. In addition, a firm may
have tax attributes, such as favorable deductions, investment tax credits,
depreciation allowances, net operating losses, that it cannot use because it has
too little income. Since the tax code does not permit the direct sale of tax
attributes, the firm may seek to merge with a firm that has income to capture
the value of the tax benefit. In this situation, the value of the whole is greater
55. Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Ross L. watts, Incentive and Tax Effects of Executive Compensation Plans,
7 AusTL. J. MGMT. 139 (1982).
56. Abbie J. Smith, The Effects of Leveraged Buyouts, 25 Bus. EcoN., Apr. 1990, at 19.
57. Wright et al., supra note 6.
58. Frank R. Lichtenberg & Donald Siegel, The Effects of Leveraged Buyouts on Productivity and
Related Aspects of Firm Behavior, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 165 (1990).
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than the sum of the parts, as the acquirer can shield its income from taxes (and
thus has increased real cash flows), and the target can realize the value of its
deductions (which it could not do on its own). Besides this ex post tax-based
merger consideration of unused tax shields, there are ex ante benefits as well:
the merger effectively provides coinsurance by diversifying expected cash
flows, so that deductions will not be wasted.5 9 Despite the real synergistic
impact on cash flows of such a tax-based acquisition, I do not classify this as
an efficiency explanation because there is a social cost to such a gain, a transfer
of wealth from the fisc to shareholders. This explanation is, therefore, more
appropriately viewed as an expropriation explanation.60
The tax explanation of takeovers is not compelling theoretically. The interest
deduction is a tax benefit that does not require an acquisition to be realized-a
target firm can leverage its capital structure on its own. This is therefore not
an equilibrium story for it implies that the firm had a suboptimal capital
structure pre-takeover. Consequently, to be plausible the increased interest-
deduction tax explanation of takeovers must be merged with an agency cost
explanation: target management has failed to maximize firm value by carrying
too little debt and paying too much in taxes.6 Moreover, the benefit from
increased deductions is limited by the implicit tax rate of debt: because interest
income is taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, investors require a higher
return to hold debt rather than equity, and at least through 1986, there was
arguably no net positive return to a firm from issuing increased debt.62
Similar criticisms can be raised concerning the other tax benefits alleged
as merger motivations. Gilson, Scholes, and Wolfson show that the value of
tax attributes such as net operating losses and step-ups in asset basis can be
obtained equally well by nonacquisition techniques, such as selective asset sales
and asset restructurings, as by acquisitions. 63 The availability of other tech-
niques to realize tax gains severely diminishes the power of a tax-driven
explanation of takeovers.
There is also little empirical support for the taxpayer expropriation expla-
nation. Auerbach and Reishus collected a comprehensive data set of several
59. Richard Green & Eli Talmor, The Structure and Incentive Effects of Corporate Tax Liabilities, 40
J. FIN. 1095, 1102-03 (1985).
60. To the extent that the failure to use a net operating loss deduction is a double tax on capital, Mark
Campisano & Roberta Romano, Recouping Losses: The Case for Full Loss Offsets, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 709,
716-18 (1981), then a merger enabling the use of the tax benefit is not expropriation from the fisc.
61. However, Kaplan finds that MBO firms' pre-buyout debt-equity ratios are not low for their
industries. He views this as suggesting that the higher debt level may not have been attainable with the pre-
buyout ownership structure. See Kaplan, supra note 9.
62. Merton Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261 (1977); see WESTON ET AL., supra note 20, at 114,
illustrating effects before and after the tax rate changes of 1986.
63. Ronald J. Gilson, Myron S. Scholes & Mark A. Wolfson, Taxation and the Dynamics of Corporate
Control: The Uncertain Case for Tax Motivated Acquisitions, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS: THE
IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER, supra note 16, at 271.
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hundred mergers from 1968-83 and found that reducing taxes was not a signifi-
cant reason for the transactions.' Only 20% of these mergers could be classi-
fied as having obvious potential tax benefits, such as the transfer of losses or
credits or a step-up in asset basis, and the estimated value of the tax benefits
was only 10% of the target's market value, a figure far below the acquisition
premiums.6 5 In addition, debt-equity ratios did not increase significantly after
the mergers." Because the magnitude of the effect is so small, it is unlikely
that the availability of income-shielding tax attributes is a significant factor in
takeovers.
Auerbach and Reishus' merger sample ends before financing acquisitions
by debt became as important a feature of takeovers as it was in the mid-1980s.
Studies of the tax effects of leveraged buyouts, where the debt load is substan-
tial, produce different results. For example, in a study of MBOs, Kaplan found
that the excess returns to public shareholders are significantly related to tax
savings from the new capital structure; in fact, the estimated tax savings
explained most of the premium.67 Schipper and Smith's findings are virtually
identical.6" In both studies, interest deductions are the key tax savings that
explain MBO premiums, not net operating losses or increased depreciation
deductions from asset basis step-ups. For example, Kaplan's median estimates
of the interest deduction benefit ranged, depending on the assumed marginal
tax rate, from 40% to 130% of the buyout premium, assuming the debt is
permanent, and from 13% to 40%, assuming repayment of the debt in 8 years.
When step-ups in asset basis are included, the median tax benefits ranged
between 21% and 143% of the premium for the full sample, and from 45% to
161% for the MBO firms that elected an asset basis step-up, which were half
of the sample firms. Schipper and Smith also find a significant relationship
between tax benefits and premiums paid in MBOs: buyout premiums were
64. Alan J. Auerbach & David Reishus, The Impact of Taxation on Mergers and Acquisitions, in
MERGERS AND ACQUISMONs 69, 81 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).
65. Hayn finds that cumulative abnormal returns to targets on acquisition announcements are positively
related to the amount of available net operating losses and asset basis step-ups. Carla Hayn, Tax Attributes
as Determinants of Shareholder Gains in Corporate Acquisitions, 23 J. FRN. ECON. 121 (1989). Her data
do not, however, lead to a substantially different conclusion from Auerbach and Reishus' conclusion
concerning the significance of taxes as a motive for takeovers. Only 20% of the targets in her sample had
net operating losses, and of the firms engaging in taxable acquisitions, the value of the asset basis step-ups
was only 16% of the target's market value.
66. The ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt plus equity increased, on average, from 25.4% to
26.7%. Auerbach and Reishus maintain that the insignificant increase is explained by the fact that, while
the mergers increased the amount of debt, equity value also increased. They conclude that the data show
that "borrowing did not outstrip the growth in value of the merged firms," and therefore, interest deductions
were not a significant factor in mergers (at least through 1983, when their sample collection ends). Auerbach
& Reishus, supra note 64, at 80.
67. Steven Kaplan, Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a Source of Value, 44 J. FIN. 611
(1989).
68. Katherine Schipper & Abbie Smith, Corporate Income Tax Effects of Management Buyouts, (June
1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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substantially higher than depreciation tax savings (the ratio of median benefits
to premium ranged between 0 and 29%) but not much higher than the interest
savings (median ratio range of 65-91%).
Although the Kaplan and Schipper and Smith studies seem to provide strong
evidence for an expropriation explanation of MBOs via increased interest
deductions, this research presents only one aspect of the tax story. As Jensen,
Kaplan, and Stiglan point out, MBOs are also accompanied by increased tax
payments by selling target shareholders, by buyout debtholders, and by the
long-term increased profitability of the reorganized firm.69 In their estimation,
the net tax payments in these transactions are positive, not negative. Summers
challenges this conclusion, contending that post-buyout debtholders are likely
to be tax-exempt institutions.70 However, his contention concerning the effect
on total tax revenues is correct only if the total debt held by tax-exempt
investors increases with the LBO, which is a disequilibrium capital market
story; an equilibrium view would suggest that these investors simply shift from
one debt instrument to LBO debt while their aggregate debt holding remains
the same.7' It should be noted that Kaplan calculates selling shareholders'
capital gains taxes at a very rough 17%, which is about equal to his lowest
estimate of MBO tax benefits.72 Plainly, analyzing the MBO tax impact solely
in terms of achieved tax savings (increased deductions) will provide an incom-
plete and inaccurate picture of what motivates these transactions. Moreover,
Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny contend that the debt tax shield benefits in MBOs
are significantly reduced by a rapid repayment of the debt.73 Lastly, for MBO
firms that go public again, post-buyout equity investors earn very high
returns. 74 As the tax savings are captured by the pre-buyout shareholders, this
indicates that MBO firms experience efficiency gains well beyond the tax
benefits. These findings, viewed in combination, seriously undermine a taxpayer
expropriation explanation of leveraged acquisitions.
2. Bondholder Expropriation
There is a third possible explanation for the use of debt in a takeover.
Leveraged acquisitions may simply be mechanisms for expropriating the wealth
of bondholders, rather than taxpayers. When a firm increases its leverage, the
69. Michael C. Jensen, Steven N. Kaplan & Laura Stiglin, The Effects of LBO's on Tax Revenues of
the U.S. Treasury, 42 TAX NoTEs 727 (1989).
70. Taxation and Corporate Debt: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 27-77, 186-204 (Jan. 25, 1989) (testimony of Lawrence H. Summers).
71. 1 would like to thank Jon Ingersoll for pointing this out to me.
72. Kaplan, supra note 67, at 626, 630.
73. Bhagat et al., supra note 26.
74. Kaplan, supra note 9, at 98.
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value of preexisting debt decreases because it is now a riskier investment (the
firm's cash flows may not cover the new debt load). As the bondholders are
not compensated for this increased risk, the leveraged transaction redistributes
wealth to the shareholders. Bondholders can and do, however, protect them-
selves from losses upon a leveraged acquisition by event-risk indenture provi-
sions.75
Several studies have sought to measure the effects of leveraged acquisitions
on target debt. Although bond ratings are typically lowered after a leveraged
buyout, studies find either no significant bond price effects or a small negative
effect which is nowhere near the magnitude of the premium paid to the share-
holders.76 Bonds without restrictive covenants, such as event-risk provisions,
which protect debtholders' investment against leverage increases, experience
the greatest losses: for example, Asquith and Wizman find that unprotected
bonds experienced negative abnormal returns of 5% whereas protected bonds
had positive abnormal returns of 2%." In addition, the size of the share-
holders' gain is not correlated with the amount of outstanding debt. Bondholder
expropriation cannot, therefore, be driving acquisitions because the bondholders'
losses are simply too small compared to takeover premiums.
3. Expropriation from Labor
The expropriation explanation of takeovers that attracts the most attention
involves labor as the victim. The most sophisticated version of this explanation
is Shleifer and Summers' breach of implicit contract explanation of hostile
takeovers.7"
In Shleifer and Summers' scenario, shareholders initially hire trustworthy
individuals as managers, in order to make credible long-term contract commit-
ments to workers. The long-term commitments are implicit, rather than explicit
contracts. After employees are hired, shareholders will want to breach the
implicit contract, in order to increase their returns by lowering labor's share.
A trustworthy management prevents them from doing so by honoring the
informal agreements. A hostile takeover will, however, permit shareholders to
75. Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen, Contractual Resolution of Bondholder-Stockholder Conflicts
in Leveraged Buyouts, J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming 1992). Lehn and Poulsen's data suggest that this
explanation is, at best, temporally bounded: use of event-risk covenants has increased rapidly over time
(from 3% of debt offered in 1986 to 32.1% of debt issued in 1989), and those provisions are more frequently
found in debt issued by firms where LBOs are likely.
76. Paul Asquith & Thierry A. Wizman, Event Risk, Covenants, and Bondholder Returns in Leveraged
Buyouts, 27 J. FiN. ECON. 195 (1990); Debra K. Denis & John J. McConnell, Corporate Mergers and
Security Returns, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 143 (1986); Marais et al., supra note 9.
77. Asquith & Wizman, supra note 76, at 201, 203.
78. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 40, at 33.
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behave opportunistically because, unlike trustworthy incumbents, a raider will
not hesitate to break implicit contracts, cutting costs and releasing the pent-up
value of the firm to shareholders.
One example of an implicit contract involves overfunded pension fund
assets. These assets-funds that exceed the benefits promised to employ-
ees-belong to the firm, but under the requirements of the ERISA statute that
regulates defined benefit plans, the firm must terminate the plan before the
excess assets revert to it and become available for other uses.79 Firms often
fund cost-of-living adjustments that are not required by their pension contract
with the excess assets in a plan.80 Because the firm has no legal obligation
to increase retirees' benefits, such a use of excess fund assets is, at best, an
implicit contractual obligation of the sort described by Shleifer and Summers.
A takeover in which a pension plan is terminated and excess assets revert to
the firm for non-plan uses might thus be characterized as a redistribution of
wealth from labor to shareholders, in breach of an implicit contract.
Shleifer and Summers' paradigmatic example is Carl Icahn's acquisition
of TWA, in which labor unions agreed to large concessions to prevent a more
loathed hostile bidder, Frank Lorenzo, from acquiring the firm. Shleifer and
Summers estimate that the cost to labor equaled 38% of the premium paid to
TWA shareholders. While this is a substantial proportion of the shareholders'
gain, obviously something else was also at stake in the acquisition to generate
the remaining 62%.
The labor costs that were reduced in this instance could emanate from the
following three sources: (1) union power (a form of monopoly rents); (2) firm-
specific skills which enhance productivity;"' or (3) management inefficiency
caused by failure to bargain effectively with unions.8 2 The first source is a
likely candidate. The airline industry was regulated when TWA's labor con-
tracts were originally negotiated, and research suggests that the prime beneficia-
ry of airline regulation was labor. 3 The third source is related to the first:
deregulation stimulates takeovers to provide more efficient managers, who bar-
gain employee compensation down to competitive levels. The second source
is where Shleifer and Summers' breach of trust argument enters. Implicit
contracts protect workers who have invested in transaction-specific human
capital. By breaking these contracts, shareholders, through the raider, expro-
79. Mark L. Mitchell & J. Harold Mulherin, The Stock Price Response to Pension Terminations and
the Relation of Terminations with Corporate Takeovers, 18 FIN. MGMT. 41(1989).
80. Jeffrey Pontiff, Andrei Shleifer & Michael S. Weisbach, Reversions of Excess Pension Assets After
Takeovers, 21 RAND J. ECON. 600 (1990).
81. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 55 (1985).
82. See WESTON ET AL., supra note 20, at 214 (offering these three explanations).
83. ELIZABETH E. BAILEY, D GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES 95-102, 197
(1985).
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priate the quasi-rent value of the workers' investments. But, as shareholders
benefit from workers who make such investments, the implicit contracts are ex
ante efficient and it is hence undesirable that they be violated ex post. We then
need a device to prevent the contracts from being broken, and trustworthy
managers are posited to perform that function.
Shleifer and Summers' thesis is clever but not convincing. A key problem
with their explanation is that it is questionable whether workers, particularly
unionized workers, would opt to protect such extremely vulnerable investments
as firm-specific capital through an implicit contract rather than some other
explicit governance structure. As Williamson details, if contracts cannot be
specified to avoid opportunism, other mechanisms will be devised to protect
the vulnerable party's investment.' The difficulty with the analysis is that
Shleifer and Summers misuse the concept of an implicit contract. As Schwartz
has observed, an implicit contract is a contract whose terms are observable to
the contracting parties, but not to third parties, such as courts, and hence, are
not verifiable. 85 An explicit contract is, correspondingly, one whose terms are
both observable and verifiable. The choice of contract type depends upon the
characteristics of the relevant contracting terms; if certain information is
observable and verifiable, then it can be the basis of an explicit contract term,
for performance of the contract can be conditioned on such a term and its
breach can be enforced in court. The terms of concern to Shleifer and Sum-
mers-pension benefits, pension fund assets, wages, employment levels-are
observable and verifiable. Thus they will be subject to explicit, and not implicit,
contracting. The absence of explicit contractual provisions on these terms'
continuation therefore suggests that TWA's unions (and, generally, any unions
that find excess pension fund assets reverted and informal cost-of-living benefits
terminated) chose not to include such terms in their contracts. They may have
opted, for instance, for higher wages in exchange for assuming the risk of loss
of increased pension benefits in the future. In this scenario, there is, then, no
implicit contract for pension increases. It is arguable, however, that there is an
implicit term which is relevant in the pension context, firm performance, that
is not equally observable to both parties and is therefore unverifiable. In this
alternative scenario, the firm contracts to increase pension benefits in financial
good times, but not in bad times. This creates a potential implicit contracting
problem, because workers may not be able to tell which state of the world
obtains when the firm seeks to terminate an overfunded plan.
Unlike pension fund assets and wage and employment levels, the level of
development of firm-specific human capital is unlikely to be verifiable in any
84. WILLIAMSON, supra note 81.
85. Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and
Judicial Strategies, at 14-16 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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scenario, and thus could be the basis of an implicit contract that a raider could
breach. The problem with this argument is that Shleifer and Summers never
identify what is firm-specific about unionized TWA workers' skills. 6 Yet the
assumption of firm-specific human capital motivates the contention that TWA
union members are more productive than unionized and non-unionized employ-
ees at other airlines, who received lower pay for similar work. Without firm-
specific capital, labor's claim for a share of takeover gains as a means of
keeping implicit promises is unpersuasive.
Finally, Shleifer and Summers offer no compelling reason why a hostile
bidder can so easily do what incumbent management cannot, bargain for wage
concessions. Many firms, including other airlines, engage in concession bargain-
ing, and such efforts are typically independent of any hostile takeover threat.
While it is not in the shareholders' interest to overpay workers, it is also not
in their interest to underpay them.
Holmstrom suggests an alternative explanation to Shleifer and Summers'
implicit contract story, which builds upon reputation. 7 In this view, managers
may be burdened with a reputation for weakness from past practices of capitu-
lating to labor demands in order to make their jobs as managers more comfort-
able, and this reputation affects their credibility as bargainers in hard times.
Thus, unlike raiders, who bring no such baggage to the negotiating table,
incumbent management cannot obtain concessions. While interesting, I do not
find this reputational explanation persuasive. It would be in labor's interest to
grant concessions to the management it knows, rather than to a hardnosed
raider, because past experience indicates that when financial conditions im-
prove, the incumbents will be ,likely to seek comfort and return to the old
regime of worker quasi-rents, whereas there is no basis to expect such favorable
treatment from a raider.
The labor expropriation explanation, in general or as refined by Shleifer and
Summers, has scant empirical support. Pontiff, Shleifer, and Weisbach find, for
instance, that pension fund asset reversions are too small to be a dominant
motive for takeovers: although they are more frequent in hostile than friendly
transactions, reversions occur in only 14% of takeovers, and they average only
10-13% of the premiums.8" Mitchell and Mulherin provide similar results:
pension fund reversions occur in 12% of the takeovers in their sample, although
they are not more frequent in hostile than in friendly bids, and the reversions
86. If TWA had newer planes than any other airline, then its pilots would have had to develop firm-
specific capital, the skills to operate those planes. Given TWA's financial condition, it is, however, unlikely
that it was ahead of its competitors in introducing the latest technology. While seniority is certainly firm-
specific, it is not related to increased productivity or value creation.
87. Bengt Holmstrom, Comment, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra
note 40, at 56.
88. Pontiff et al., supra note 80.
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account for a somewhat higher proportion of the premium (23%). 81 More
important, most pension fund reversions do not occur after a corporate take-
over.
90
The TWA anecdote is difficult to generalize, given the industry's unique
circumstances of moving from regulation (where managerial discretion, the
other side of management trustworthiness, is substantial) to deregulation.91
Several studies examining the aftermath of takeovers more systematically do
not find a similar dramatic impact on labor as in the TWA takeover. For
example, apart from the already-mentioned greater turnover of top management,
it is middle management (administrative staff), and not production plant
employees, whose ranks are slimmed down after acquisitions.92 Consistent
with such data, Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey find, in a sample of 286 plant
closings, that very few (48) were announced by takeover targets, either before,
after, or during the bid, and only 22 of those were targets of hostile bids.93
Moreover, firms experiencing ownership changes have higher employment and
wage levels and increased productivity compared to firms that do not change
control.94 Finally, Kaplan finds in a sample of leveraged buyout firms that
employment increased after the transaction (although it is not as large an
increase as that of their industries), while Lichtenberg and Siegel find leveraged
buyout finrns' employment declined, compared to their industries, but at a
slower rate than before the buyout.95
Rosett tests Shleifer and Summers' breach of contract explanation more
directly by examining union wage contracts before and after takeovers.96 He
finds no support for their thesis: there is, in fact, a positive gain in union wealth
levels after hostile acquisitions. Although there are losses after friendly acquisi-
tions, even then the losses are insignificant relative to the premiums (when
measured over 18 years after the takeover, the union losses in friendly acquisi-
89. Mitchell & Mulherin, supra note 79. They explain this difference in terms of sample construction:
Pontiff, Shleifer and Weisbach excluded mergers from their sample, which will overstate the relative
frequency of hostile bids because mergers are always classified as friendly, and they counted some
acquisitions by white knights as hostile rather than friendly.
90. id.
91. Oliver E. Williamson, Comment, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES supra
note 40, at 61.
92. Frank R. Lichtenberg & Donald Siegel, The Effects of Takeovers on the Employment and Wages
of Central-Office and Other Personnel (Feb. 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
93. David W. Blackwell, M. Wayne Marr & Michael F. Spivey, Plant-closing Decisions and the Market
Value of the Firm, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 277, 283, tbl. 3 (1990).
94. Charles Brown & James L. Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on Labor, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 40, at 9; Frank R. Lichtenberg & Donald Siegel,
Productivity and Changes in Ownership of Manufacturing Plants, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
AcrvrrY 643 (Martin Neil Bailey & Clifford Winston, eds., 1987).
95. Kaplan, supra note 9, at 97-98; Lichtenberg & Siegel, supra note 58.
96. Joshua G. Rosett, Do Union Wealth Concessions Explain Takeover Premiums? The Evidence on
Contract Wages, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 263 (1990).
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tions equal approximately 5% of the shareholders' gain). Bhagat, Shleifer, and
Vishny also find that layoffs occur infrequently, affect high-level white collar
workers, are higher when management successfully defeats a bid (either by
remaining independent or by finding a white knight) than when a hostile bidder
succeeds and, most important, result in losses that are small compared to
takeover premiums (10-20%). 97 In sum, while we would need counterfactual
data to test the labor expropriation hypothesis fully-we need to know how
many workers would have been laid off 8 or what the wage profile would have
looked like if the firm had not been acquired-what we do know suggests that
expropriation from labor does not motivate takeovers.
4. Market Power
A traditional explanation for takeovers that falls in the expropriation cate-
gory is that takeovers increase market power, thereby allowing the merged firm
to obtain a monopoly position and earn monopoly rents. This explanation was
popular at the turn of the century, and is less important as a rationale in recent
years because such combinations are illegal under the antitrust laws. It is
obviously an expropriation explanation: with increased market power, a firm
is able to increase its price above marginal cost, extracting consumer surplus
and shutting off the market from some buyers. Takeover gains therefore
represent a transfer of wealth from consumers to shareholders. Of course, this
explanation is limited because there are many takeovers that -cannot be moti-
vated by monopoly power, such as acquisitions of unrelated businesses.
Studies have sought to measure the effect of potentially anticompetitive
acquisitions by examining competitors' stock prices, and they have found no
effect. If a merger is anticompetitive, then rival firms' stock prices should either
decrease upon the merger announcement as they will be at a competitive
disadvantage, for instance if the merged firm will engage in predatory pricing,
or increase on the merger announcement and fall on the commencement of an
antitrust challenge, as they will be able to share in the increased prices that the
merged firm will be able to charge (the "collusion theory"). Studies find that
rivals experience either significantly positive or insignificant stock price reac-
tions to horizontal merger announcements, but no price effects when the merger
is challenged, or invalidated, on antitrust grounds.99
97. Bhagat et al., supra note 26, at 2.
98. Of course, a decrease in employment levels need not imply an efficiency loss. It could be socially
efficient to reduce labor in a particular firm or sector.
99. B. Espen Eckbo, Horizontal Mergers, Collusion and Stockholder Wealth, II J. FIN. ECON. 241
(1983); B. Espen Eckbo & Peggy Wier, Antimerger Policy under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: A Reexamina-
tion of the Market Power Hypothesis, 28 J. L. & ECON. 119 (1985); Robert Stillman, Examining Antitrust
Policy Towards Horizontal Mergers, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 225 (1983).
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Other studies have found that the returns to unrelated (conglomerate)
acquisitions in the 1980s are lower than the returns to related acquisitions,"
and that most hostile takeovers result in reallocations of assets to related buyers
in subsequent divestitures. 0 1 The higher value of related acquisitions may
evidence operating synergy gains, but it may also evidence anticipated gains
from increased market power. However, Healy, Palepu and Ruback find that
merged firms' improved cash flows are due to increased asset productivity that
is not attributable to monopoly rents because there is no post-merger increase
in sales margins.1"2 This expropriation explanation of takeovers cannot, then,
be accorded much credence given current knowledge. It is altogether possible,
however, that future analyses of gains from related-firm acquisitions will alter
this conclusion and revive a moribund monopoly power explanation.
C. Value-Maximizing Market Inefficiency Explanations
The final value-maximizing (that is, beneficial to acquirers' shareholders)
explanation of takeover gains is premised on market inefficiency, the view that
stock prices do not reflect firms' "fundamental value." According to this
explanation, which is probably as widely-circulated in the popular press as the
labor expropriation explanation, acquirers exploit market inefficiency by
identifying undervalued firms, and presumably capture a large share of the gains
by paying premiums below the correct valuation. There are two distinct market
inefficiency explanations: general underpricing of stocks and myopia (overvalu-
ation of current profits and excessive discounting of future profits).
1. Underpricing
The most general version of the market inefficiency explanation of take-
overs is that the capital market simply misprices securities. Acquiring firms
identify undervalued securities and profit from the difference between the price
they pay and the firm's true value. Given the size of the premiums received
in takeovers, this explanation cannot be characterized as an expropriation
explanation from current investors in targets to bidders. Because the target
shareholders' gain is not a "real" gain, in that it does not depend on any
100. Morck et al., supra note 13.
101. Bhagat et al., supra note 26. Kaplan and Weisbach contend that the gain from conglomerate
firms' sales of acquired firms to related-industry buyers in the 1980s is not a reflection of the initial
acquisition's negative value, but rather a function of changes in antitrust law enforcement. KAPLAN &
WEISBACH, supra note 1"4. Antitrust law enforcement in the 1980s permitted more efficient horizontal
acquisitions that had not been allowed when the conglomerates had made the acquisitions under study, and
this change is what made divestiture so profitable.
102. Healy et al., supra note 17, at 21.
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operating improvements or other changes to be undertaken by the bidder in the
future, this explanation is also classified separately from the efficiency-enhanc-
ing explanations of takeovers.
There is no evidence Supporting the underpricing explanation of takeover
gains. In particular, if this explanation was correct, then once a bidder identified
a target, its price would rise and remain at the higher true value, regardless of
whether the acquisition occurred. Several studies find, however, that the stock
price of takeover targets that are not acquired returns to its lower pre-bid
price. 3 Takeovers therefore do not merely provide an inefficient market with
the information necessary for revaluing stock prices. More generally, the large
body of event studies examining numerous events in corporate finance besides
acquisitions casts doubt on this explanation, as the studies are supportive of
market efficiency."°
2. Market Myopia
The market myopia inefficiency explanation is more sophisticated than the
underpricing hypothesis. In this explanation, investors are short-sighted and
behave myopically to sacrifice long-term benefits for immediate profits. As a
consequence, firms that engage in long-term planning and make substantial
investments in research and development (R&D) are supposedly undervalued
by the market and become takeover targets. To avoid undervalued stock,
managers thus also behave myopically and shift from profitable long-term
investments to more easily valued short-term projects. 5 This explanation of
takeovers could be characterized as efficiency-enhancing, because the acquirer
presumably gains by taking the firm private and undertaking the neglected long-
term investments. As Netter suggests, it can also be given an expropriation
103. Asquith, supra note 39; Michael Bradley, Anand Desai & E. Han Kim, The Rationale behind
Interfirm Tender Offers: Information or Synergy 1II J. FIN. EcoN. 183 (1983); Gregg A. Jarrell, The Wealth
Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge?, 28 J.L. & ECON. 151 (1985).
104. Tests of asset-pricing models have uncovered anomalies that cast doubt on the models' predictabil-
ity of returns; these models are the focus of the current finance controversy over market efficiency, and
there are interpretations consistent with both sides. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: 11, 46 J. FIN.
1575, 1577, 1609 (1991). Because of the joint-hypothesis problem, that tests of market efficiency are joint
tests of efficiency and of a particular asset-pricing model, the anomalies can be understood as showing either
that the asset-pricing model is misspecified or that the market is inefficient. Event studies using daily returns
data avoid the joint-hypothesis problem that plagues predictability of returns studies because event studies
examine abnormal returns on precise dates rather than over long intervals, and the method of estimating
normal returns and hence calculating abnormal returns (i.e., the asset-pricing model) has little effect on
inferences when the response to an event is large and concentrated over a few days. Id. at 1601-02, 1607.
These studies demonstrate extremely quick market reactions to firm-specific information and they thus
provide the cleanest evidence of market efficiency. Id. at 1601-02.
105. Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. EcoN. 61 (1988).
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gloss, as a "redistribution from the future" to the present. o In this alterna-
tive view, the acquirers are myopic and slash R&D budgets to raise stock
value.
There is, however, no empirical support for a myopia explanation. First,
there is no evidence of market myopia regarding long-term investment. The
market responds positively to announcements of increases in R&D and other
capital investment expenditures." Second, there is scant evidence of the
posited manager myopia. Firms that protect themselves from takeovers by
adopting defensive charter amendments, thus ostensibly freeing themselves from
market myopia, °" actually decrease their R&D expenditures after taking such
action. °9 In addition, targets (especially of LBOs) are in industries with low
levels of R&D activity, and there are no significant differences in R&D inten-
sity (the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales) between acquiring and acquired
firms."10 Finally, there are no significant differences in the growth of R&D
(as measured by intensity or employment levels) between firms involved in
acquisitions and those that are not."'
D. Non-Value-Maximizing Expropriation Explanations
There are four non-value-maximizing explanations of takeovers. The first
three are related, as they are all forms of managerialism: diversification, self-
aggrandizement and free cash flow excesses by acquirers. The fourth, the hubris
hypothesis, is a non-value-maximizing explanation ex post (once the bid is
made) and not necessarily ex ante: managers may intend to maximize equity
share prices by an acquisition but they overvalue the transaction's gains.
106. Jeffry Netter, Ending the Interest Deductibility of Debt Used to Finance Takeovers Is Still a Bad
Idea: The Empirical Evidence on Takeovers, Restrictions on Takeovers, and Restrictions on Deductibility
ofInterest, 15 J. CORP. L. 219, 231 (1990).
107. Su Han Chan, John D. Martin & John W. Kensinger, Corporate Research and Development
Expenditures and Share Value, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 255 (1990); John J. McConnell & Chris J. Muscarella,
Capital Expenditure Decisions and Market Value of the Firm, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 399 (1985); SEC OFFICE
OF CHIEF ECONOMIST, INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP, TENDER OFFERS AND LONG TERM INVESTMENTS (1985).
108. Stein, supra note 105.
109. Lisa K. Muelbroek et al., Shark Repellants and Managerial Myopia: An Empirical Test, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 1108 (1990).
110. Bronwyn H. Hall, The Impact of Corporate Restructuring on Industrial Research and Devel-
opment, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1990, supra note 26, at 85.
[hereinafter Hall, Corporate Restructuring]; Bronwyn H. Hall, The Effect of Takeover Activity on Corporate
Research and Development, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES supra note 40, at
69 [hereinafter Hall, Takeover Activity]; Smith, supra note 56.
111. Hall, Takeover Activity, supra note 110; Lichtenberg & Siegel, supra note 92. Hall finds some
evidence that R&D intensity decreases with increased leverage upon an acquisition, but as most leveraged
acquisitions do not occur in industries where R&D is important, she cannot determine the significance of
the decrease, i.e., whether the firms are foregoing positive net present value projects or there are, in fact,
no attractive innovation opportunities. Hall, Corporate Restructuring, supra note 110.
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1. Diversification
One explanation of takeovers, which focuses on conglomerate mergers, is
diversification: merging two income streams to reduce risk. If merging firms'
cash flows are not perfectly positively correlated, then the debt capacity of the
combined firm is increased, as the risk of insolvency decreases. The benefit
from the reduction in cash flow variability cannot be attained by either firm
separately, and hence it can be classified as a financial synergy gain. Addition-
ally, because the intangible capital or goodwill that a firm builds up is lost upon
bankruptcy, diversification, by lowering the risk of bankruptcy, preserves the
value of that reputational or organizational capital.
A diversification explanation may be important in bank mergers. As
Hawawini and Swary argue, regulators impose solvency requirements on firms
through capital adequacy requirements, and implicitly define the upper bounds
of bankruptcy, thus providing banks with an incentive to diversify." 2 In addi-
tion, banks are viewed as having an important investment in goodwill in the
bank-customer relationship, which, they maintain, increases the value of
avoiding insolvency."' Hawawini and Swary provide some support for this
diversification thesis: mergers between banks with low stock return correlations
are associated with significantly higher abnormal returns than high stock return
correlation mergers, and the variance of target bank stock returns decreases
significantly upon the merger.'14
But apart from the special case of bank mergers, this explanation is not
compelling. Modem finance theory indicates that diversification will not
increase the market value of the merged entity beyond the sum of the separate
values of the two companies, because investors can diversify more cheaply on
their own by diversifying their stock portfolios (buying shares in the two
companies). In addition, if investors are diversified, then they are not benefitted
if a company reduces its own risk, and they will not pay to have that risk
reduced. This is because diversified investors are concerned only about market
or systematic risk and not idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk."5 Consequently,
the value of the merged firm will not be greater than the sum of its parts." 6
Moreover, the reduction in cash flow risk comes at the shareholders' expense,
transferring wealth from equity to debtholders, as the risk of insolvency has
112. HAWAWINI & SWARY, supra note 24.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 107, 146.
115. STEPHEN A. ROSS, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD & JEFFREY F. JAFFE, CORPORATE FINANCE (2d
ed. 1990).
116. Kaiser Industries provides an excellent example. Kaiser was a holding company whose assets
were controlling interests in three publicly traded operating companies; its stock, however, traded at a
substantial discount from the market value of its holdings. GILSON, supra note 27, at 624.
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decreased, which increases the value of existing debt, and correspondingly
decreases the equity's value. Indeed, Galai and Masulis contend that the debt
level in the merged firm must increase if the equity's pre-acquisition value is
to be maintained." 7
In some situations, however, personal diversification may be more costly
than corporate level diversification, and to that extent we cannot reject this
explanation out of hand. For instance, consider an investor who bought IBM
stock in 1955. The price of her shares has gone up twenty-fold, and she now
may have an undiversified portfolio. If she sells some IBM stock to diversify,
she would have to pay substantial tax on the sale. This investor might prefer
IBM to reduce her risk by diversifying its operations."' A more plausible
candidate is the investor who is the founder, chief executive and majority
shareholder of a publicly-traded company. Such an investor will typically have
a similar problem to the long-term IBM shareholder; although she is wealthy,
all her eggs are in that one basket, her company. If she sells her holdings to
diversify, she is likely to have a large tax due and she may have to relinquish
control. In such a situation the investor may be better off merging with a firm
in a different line of business. She will then have, at least, two baskets. The
point of these examples is that someone who is unable to diversify might
benefit from corporate level diversification. These examples are not, however,
applicable to most public companies nor to most investors.
While most shareholders do not find portfolio diversification costly, and are
therefore not benefited by firm-level diversification, there is a special set of
individuals who do benefit from such diversification---corporate managers. The
risk preferences of managers and shareholders differ: managers' wealth is tied
up in their firms, and unlike shareholders, they cannot diversify. Imperfections
in the capital market due to moral hazard concerns prevent managers from
being able to borrow the full value of their future income stream from the firm,
which would enable them to diversify their wealth. Managers are thus subject
to firm-specific risk. Assuming they are risk-averse, they will seek to reduce
that risk, action that is in direct conflict with the shareholders' risk preference.
Accordingly, managers will engage in mergers that reduce firm-specific risk
in order to diversify their own portfolios.' 9
117. Dan Galai & Ronald W. Masulis, The Option Pricing Model and the Risk Factor of Stock, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 53, 68-69 (1976).
118. Mutual swap-funds provided such investors a better way to diversify without any tax
cost-investors contributed their different appreciated stocks to a mutual fund in a tax-free exchange for
fund shares. See Marvin A. Chirelstein, Tax Pooling and Tax Postponement - The Capital Exchange Funds,
75 YALE L. 183 (1965). The incorporation provision, I.R.C. § 351, was amended in 1966 to impose a
tax on these transactions. See Pub. L. No. 89-809, § 203(c) (1966).
119. Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers,
12 BELL J. ECON. 605 (1981).
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Firm-level diversification presumably comes at a cost to diversified share-
holders, as the firm pays a premium for the target. This explanation of take-
overs is the principal-agent problem writ large: mergers are non-value-maximiz-
ing transactions that benefit managers at the shareholders' expense. Investors
bear the costs of the diversifying merger but they do not receive any commen-
surate benefits because they are diversified and are therefore not concerned
about firm-specific risk. A diversification motive for mergers therefore entails
a wealth transfer from shareholders to managers.
We could, however, put a value-maximizing spin on this non-value-maxi-
mizing. explanation. Because managers' risk is reduced by diversifying, share-
holders may be able to pay managers less in compensation. The reduced risk
may also encourage managers to make investments in firm-specific human
capital which are valuable to shareholders. If either of these possibilities occur,
then shareholders as well as managers will gain from diversifying acquisitions,
and such transactions should therefore not be characterized as non-value-
maximizing transactions (assuming any efficiency losses from the diversifying
merger do not swamp the gains from the reduced compensation or enhanced
human capital).
There is some evidence consistent with a non-value-maximizing diversi-
fication explanation. Amihud and Lev and Lloyd, Modani, and Hand find that
manager-controlled firms are more likely to engage in diversifying mergers than
are owner-controlled firms, and the income streams and operations of manager-
controlled firms are more diversified than those of owner-controlled firms. 20
But to distinguish conclusively between the value-maximizing and non-value-
maximizing variants of this explanation, we would need additional information
that controls for executive compensation levels.
2. Self-aggrandizement
The manager risk reduction diversification explanation is a subset of what
can generally be described as a managerialist perspective on the firm. The
motivation for an acquisition is the maximization of the manager's utility rather
than of the shareholders' wealth, or more simply put, self-aggrandizement. Risk
may be a concern, but power or empire-building may be the goal as well, and
these are indeed the more traditional managerialist explanations of take-
overs.
121
If the managerialist view of the firm explains mergers, then we would
expect a negative correlation between bidder and target returns. Weston, Chung,
120. Id.; William P. Lloyd, Naval K. Modani & John H. Hand, The Effect of the Degree of Ownership
Control on Firm Diversification, Market Value, and Merger Activity, 15 J. Bus. RESEARCH 303 (1987).
121. See, e.g., Robin Man'is, A Model of the "Managerial" Enterprise, 77 Q.J. ECON. 185 (1963).
148
Vol. 9: 119, 1992
Takeovers
and Hoag's finding of a significant positive correlation in pure conglomerate
and product-extension mergers is inconsistent with managerialism. However,
there are studies that provide some support for the thesis. Lewellen, Loderer,
and Rosenfeld find that there is a positive relation between acquirers' abnormal
returns and management's stock ownership.' 22 This indicates that manager-
ialist motives may be important when management's incentives to act in the
shareholders' interest are weakest. In addition, Byrd and Hickman find that
there is a positive relation between acquirers' abnormal returns and the indepen-
dence of the acquirers' boards. The abnormal returns are significantly negative
when less than half of the board are outside directors, and insignificantly
negative when a majority are outsiders, and the difference across the two groups
is significant.'23 This suggests that managers who are not monitored are likely
to engage in non-value-maximizing acquisitions. Finally, Mitchell and Lehn's
finding that bad bidders make good targets is relevant here. While it supports
Manne's disciplining story regarding takeovers, it also offers some support for
managerialism, for it indicates that at least some acquisitions are profoundly
misconceived."M
3. Free Cash Flow on the Acquirers' Side
While the emphasis in free cash flow theory is on the target, the acquirer
may have free cash flow as well. Making an acquisition uses the excess cash.
This variant of the free cash flow explanation is an example of a non-value-
maximizing explanation of acquisitions. The acquisition may, however, be less
wasteful than alternative expenditures the managers would undertake in its
absence. As with the diversification explanation, the free cash flow explanation
is a special case of the more general self-aggrandizement explanation.
Several studies provide evidence consistent with this explanation. Acquirers
experience abnormal positive returns before an acquisition,"' but they also
have low Tobin's q ratios.'26 These findings suggest that acquirers have ample
free cash. 27 More direct support comes from Mitchell and Lehn's study of
122. Wilbur Lewellen, Claudio Loderer & Ahron Rosenfeld, Merger Decisions and Executive Stock
Ownership in Acquiring Firms, 7 J. Acr. & ECON. 209 (1985).
123. John Byrd & Kent Hickman, Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence from Tender
Offer Bids (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
124. The problem Mitchell and Lehn's data pose for the managerialist explanation is that some
acquirers-the nontargets in their sample-experience positive abnormal returns. See Mitchell & Lehn,
supra note 42. This should not be the case if all acquisitions were motivated by managerialism.
125. Ellert, supra note 39.
126. Lang et al., supra note 41; Servaes, supra note 41.
127. Unlike the target firms, the acquirers in Servaes' sample did not have lower dividend payout rates
than their industry peers, although they did have lower debt levels and capital expenditures. Servaes, supra
note 40; see supra note 52. Both of these latter differences were, however, smaller than the differences
between the targets and their industry peers.
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which bidders become targets: the managers who are subsequently disciplined
by a takeover are those who engaged in negative net present value acquisitions,
that is, those who wasted free cash flow. Mitchell and Lehn's finding thus fits
better with a free cash flow explanation than the more general managerialist
explanation. It can be understood as a marriage of Marris (managerialist
explanation) and Manne (inefficient management explanation), for takeovers
are both the epitome of the agency problem and its solution. Specifically, firms
whose managers engage in non-value-maximizing acquisitions-wasting free
cash-are themselves acquired, in keeping with the agency cost reduction
theory's hypothesis that takeovers discipline managers.
Finally, a recent study by Lang, Stulz, and Walkling provides further
support for this explanation.' They find that an increase in free cash flow
equal to 1% of a bidder's total assets is associated with a decrease in the
bidder's gain from the takeover equal to 1% of its common stock. In addition,
free cash flow explains more of the variation in bidder returns than other
variables, such as the number of bidders, target management's resistance, and
the bidder's size in relation to that of the target. Their data do not, however,
provide support for an expropriation explanation in which wealth is transfered
from acquirers to targets, because target returns are not affected by the bidder's
cash flow.
4. Hubris and the Winner's Curse
Roll has expounded another managerialist explanation, which he terms the
"hubris" hypothesis."2 9 In this view, managers seek to make value-maximizing
acquisitions, but they make mistakes and overvalue targets (or their abilities
to turn targets around). When the acquirer's stock price falls upon the an-
nouncement of a bid, the managers do not heed this warning of their impending
mistake. Rather, they are infected with pride and persist in believing that their
valuation is correct and the market is wrong. Their hubris prevents them from
admitting their mistake and calling off the deal, and they end up paying too
much for the target firm. The transaction thus is a wealth transfer from the
acquirer's shareholders to the target's shareholders.
Roll's thesis is related to the winner's curse phenomenon in sealed-bid
auctions. 3 ° When the value to the bidders of the auctioned item is uncertain,
128. Harry H.P. Lang, Rend M. Stulz & Ralph A. Walkling, A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis:
The Case of Bidder Returns, 29 J. FIN. EcoN. 315 (1991).
129. Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUs. 197 (1986).
130. In some takeover auctions, the competing bidders make sequential public offers. Because these
are not sealed bid auctions, they are not subject to the winner's curse (a bidder can learn about the value
of the object, and hence the size of its estimation error, from the other bids). However, these sequential
public auctions have become relatively rare ever since target boards began to run formal auctions, as they
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the person who has overestimated the value the most will be the winner. This
is because a positive evaluation error produces a winning bid, but a negative
error does not. The intuition is that the winning bidder pays too much--that
is why he is the winner. Winning is bad news (a "curse") because it signifies
that all other bidders' estimates were lower. That is, the winner had the highest
positive evaluation error. 3' This explanation does not imply that the acquisi-
tion was ex inte a negative net present value transaction (non-value-maximiz-
ing); rather, it is so ex post, once there is competition and an auction for the
firm.
The negative returns to bidding firms in the 1980s, when takeover auctions
increased, lend support to Roll's hypothesis.'32 In addition, Varaiya has found
that bidders overpay: the difference between the bid premium (abnormal return)
and the combined market value of bidder and target firms is positive and
significant (that is, there is an overpayment).'33 However, the finding of sev-
eral researchers that the net return to acquisitions is positive-target gains are
greater than bidder losses,134 indicates that takeovers involve more than sim-
ply a wealth transfer from bidder shareholders to managers and target share-
holders: there is either an efficiency gain or a third-party wealth transfer
accompanying the transaction.
A winner's curse or hubris hypothesis is, furthermore, not a long-run
equilibrium explanation because we expect bidders to learn from their expe-
rience and adjust their bids downward (or not bid) to avoid the winner's
curse. 35 If, however, many bidders engage in only one transaction, it is
possible that the market will exhibit no learning. The financial intermediaries
that advise acquirers are repeat players, who could transmit the requisite
knowledge to a new client, but this market feature maynot help the one-time
bidder. In any specific transaction, the intermediary's incentive structure works
against counselling a downward revision, as intermediaries are paid more when
have since the rnid-1980s, after the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). See infra text accompanying note 141.
131. Nikhil P. Varaiya, The "Winner's Curse" Hypothesis and Corporate Takeovers, 9 MANAGERIAL
& DECISION ECON. 209 (1988).
132. Bradley et al., supra note 13. 1 consider these data evidence of the hubris and winner's curse
explanation rather than the managerialist explanation because the negative returns appear only in the 1980s,
when auctions were relatively frequent. The managerialist explanation would predict negative returns to
bidders, regardless of the presence of auctions, as it considers acquisitions negative net present value
transactions ex ante. The positive returns in the 1960s and 1970s (when auctions were both less common
and unlikely to follow a sealed-bid format) are inconsistent with managerialism, but not the hubris or
winner's curse hypothesis.
133. Varaiya, supra note 131.
134. Bradley et al., supra note 13; KAPLAN & WEISBACH, supra note 14; Lang et al., supra note 41;
Servaes, supra note 41.
135. There is evidence that bidders do adjust their bids downward to evade the winner's curse. See
R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. LIT. 699 (1987); Stuart E. Thiel,
Some Evidence on the Winner's Curse, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 884 (1988).
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their client wins the auction. The key is therefore whether intermediaries suffer
adverse reputational effects from client overpayments, which depends on
whether deals sour quickly enough for potential clients to be able to attribute
bad deals to the intermediaries' poor advice. Over the long run we would
expect this effect to occur, and any problem of overbidding in the corporate
takeover market should be self-correcting.
None of the studies of returns to bidders disaggregate their sample by
acquirer identity (repeat or one-shot buyers). We therefore do not know whether
there is learning in the takeover market (that is, whether repeat players fare
better or worse than one-timers). If we found that there is learning (if, for
example, repeat bidders do not earn negative returns), then concern that the
negative abnormal returns data evince systematic non-value-maximizing behav-
ior by acquirers would be mitigated.
E. Summary and Conclusion
The preceding discussion-the explanations of takeovers and supporting
empirical evidence-is summarized in Table 1. There is a substantial body of
research that is consistent with agency cost reduction or synergy gain explana-
tions of takeovers. There is, however, scant support for any of the expropriation
explanations, whether the hypothetical victims are bondholders, labor, consum-
ers or the government. There is even less support for market inefficiency
explanations.
The data are more ambiguous regarding non-value-maximizing explanations.
Manager-controlled firms engage in more diversifying mergers than owner-
controlled firms and some acquirers earned negative abnormal returns in the
1980s. But these data can also be interpreted asconsistent with value-maximiza-
tion: firm-level diversification may lower executive compensation costs, and
competition (auctions) reduces bidders' returns and may lead to overpayment
(winner's curse). Most important, the net gains of acquisitions remain positive
when bidder and target returns are matched. This finding undercuts the non-
value-maximizing interpretation because it indicates that the gain from acquisi-
tions is more than a simple transfer of wealth from acquirers to targets.











2. Reduced Agency Costs
a. Inefficient
Management






- positive correlation between bidder and target returns in pure
conglomerate and product extension mergers; smaller bidding
banks experience higher returns than larger bidding banks;
higher returns in bank mergers the smaller the target bank
relative to the acquiring bank; related acquisitions more
profitable than unrelated acquisitions; substantial portion of
gains from hostile takeovers due to reallocation of target assets
to purchasers in related industries.
- capital expenditure planning shifted to central headquarters;
higher premiums when acquirer's cash flow rate higher than
target's; increased capital outlays after acquisitions; accounting
conventions have no stock price effects.
- low stock return correlation bank mergers associated with
significantly higher abnormal returns than high stock return
correlation bank mergers; target bank stock return variability
decreases after merger.
- high management turnover after takeover; bidders have higher
rates of return than targets; targets have low Tobin's q ratios;
hostile takeover targets are poor performers; targets whose
managers are replaced had negative returns pre-takeover; bad
bidders make good targets; significant cash flow improvements
after both unrelated and related-firm acquisitions.
- probability of going private directly related to free cash flow
and inversely related to growth; premiums correlated with free
cash flow; targets have low Tobin's q ratios.
- productivity and operating improvements post-buyout; returns
on going public (post-buyout value increase) directly related to
management's equity stake.
- interest deduction explains significant portion of MBO
premium, other tax benefits not important; net tax effect from
MBO estimated as positive and debt shield value reduced by
rapid repayment; post-buyout investors earn very high return in
reverse buyouts.















- small negative or no significant impact on bondholder wealth;
size of gain not correlated with amount of outstanding debt;
protective covenants increasingly used in industries where LBOs
more likely.
- no significant negative impact on employment levels, except
for top and middle managers; some evidence that employment
increases with control changes; no significant wage effect;
overfunded pension reversions not significant factor.
- no effect on competitors' stock prices; unrelated acquisitions
less profitable than related acquisitions in the 1980s; hostile
takeovers reallocate assets to related buyers.
- stock prices of targets that are not acquired return to pre-bid
levels; event studies generally supportive of market efficiency.
- stock prices respond positively to increases in research and
development (R&D) and capital investment expenditures; post-
acquisition R&D expenditures do not decrease; targets in low
intensity R&D industries and tend to spend less on R&D than
industry; firms reduce R&D expenditures after adopting
defensive charter amendments.
- manager-controlled firms more likely to engage in diversifying
mergers than owner-controlled firms.
- bidder and target return correlations in pure conglomerate and
product extension mergers are positive and not negative; positive
relation between acquirers' abnormal returns and management
stock ownership; bad bidders make good targets; acquirers'
returns less negative when board is independent.
- bad bidders are more likely to be acquired than good bidders;
acquirers have positive abnormal returns before acquisition;
acquirers have low Tobin's q ratios; free cash flow explains
variance in returns across bidders; increases in free cash flow
associated with decreases in bidders' gain from a takeover.
- negative returns to acquirers in 1980s; bad bidders make good
targets; bidders overpay in auctions.
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I therefore read the literature as most consonant with the value-maximizing,
efficiency-enhancing explanations of takeovers. However, different takeover
theories each explain best only subsets of acquisitions and, though empirical
studies might point in a particular direction, none are conclusive. There may
be, then, instances of non-value-maximizing acquisitions as well as acquisitions
which transfer wealth from particular groups to target shareholders, but these
should be viewed as the exception, rather than the rule.
II. Regulatory Implications
Takeovers are regulated under a dual i'egime of federal and state laws. The
principal federal legislation is the Williams Act, 136 which places disclosure
and other substantive requirements on the takeover bidding process and is
administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission and federal courts.
Federal tax and antitrust laws also affect takeovers, and presidential review and
approval is required for certain acquisitions by foreigners.
State takeover laws apply to corporations incorporated in the legislating
state, although some laws extend to firms with physical operations in the state
as well. While the earliest state statutes ("first generation"), which established
disclosure and review requirements for bids, were struck down for unconstitu-
tionally burdening interstate commerce in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,' subsequent
statutes ("second generation"), imposing restrictions on acquirers' voting rights,
were upheld in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.3 ' The primary
mechanism of state regulation is, however, judicial, because courts oversee the
bidding process, and can thereby immunize management's defensive tactics.
Because second generation statutes and judicially-sanctioned defensive tactics
go beyond the Williams Act's strictures on bidders, the states have become the
more important jurisdiction for takeover regulation.
This section seeks to explicate the intended and unintended effects of this
dual regulatory regime, illuminating where legislators or policymakers make
mistakes, where they do not, and where the data do not permit us to draw
conclusions. It is not an exhaustive review. Rather, it is selective, focusing on
what I consider to be the more critical regulations. For ease of exposition, the
discussion is organized by the regulation's substantive content, rather than its
source (federal, state, or judicial), although on some occasions these are coter-
minous. To preview the section's coverage, see Table 2.
136. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g, 781-78n, 78s
(1988)).
137. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
138. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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A. Regulation Encouraging Takeover Auctions
One of the primary effects of takeover regulation is the facilitation of
auctions for target firms. Any regulation that delays the consummation of a
hostile bid, for example, increases the likelihood of an auction by providing
time for another bidder to enter the fray, upon the target's solicitation or
otherwise. Major federal regulation furthers auctions through the Williams Act's
minimum offer period, mandatory withdrawal rights and 5% accumulation
disclosure requirements,' 39 and the premerger notification, reporting and wait-
ing period requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. ' °
Auctions have also been fostered at the state level. First generation state
takeover statutes, whose disclosure and hearing requirements had expanded
upon the Williams Act's terms, were followed by second generation control
share acquisition statutes, which require bidders to wait for a shareholders'
meeting before they can either purchase shares or hold shares with full voting
rights. These statutes delay the completion of bids. Moreover, the Delaware
court's fiduciary duty rules, as expounded in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc.,' l by commanding managers to maximize the price
shareholders receive when their company is put up for sale, may require an
auction. 42  Finally, management's principal defensive tactic, the poison
pill, 4 3 also promotes auctions, as it permits the board to negotiate the redemp-
tion of the pill with a preferred bidder. But by adjudicating when a poison pill
is to be redeemed, courts may replace boards as the actual auctioneers, because
139. Formerly, the Act's antifraud provisions also facilitated auctions because, until the poison pill
provided a better defense, target management would bring lawsuits under these regulations to gain time to
find a preferred suitor. See Jarrell, supra note 103.
140. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (West Supp. 1991).
141. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
142. The auction requirement may devolve into the question whether the target has put itself up for
sale. See, e.g., Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). Moreover, courts
approve various techniques that may circumvent auctions, such as passive auctions, Barkan v. Amsted Indus.,
567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989), and mergers that shareholders approve, In re Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc.
Shareholders Litigation, Civ. No. 11495 (Del. Ch. Sept. 6, 1990). Revlon's auction rule was cut back in
Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990), which, in defining what constitutes
putting the firm up for sale, in its narrowest reading, exempted stock-for-stock mergers, Herd v. Major
Realty Corp., Civ. No. 10707 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 1990).
143. A poison pill is a shareholder rights plan in which the firm issues a warrant on each share of
common stock (except those owned by the triggering shareholder) that gives the holder the right to acquire
preferred stock for a low price. The right is contingent upon the occurrence of either a tender offer for the
common or an accumulation of a block of common stock. The preferred stock has superior dividend and
liquidation rights and is convertible into shares of the acquirer, at a steep discount, if the common stock
is exchanged in a merger. Boards can redeem the rights for a trivial amount in the case of a tender offer,
but the rights become nonredeemable upon the block acquisition.
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they not only constrain the bidding process the board chooses, but they also
decide when the auction ends.'
The uniform and persistent adoption of regulations that facilitate takeover
auctions raises an obvious question: are auctions desirable? For ease of exposi-
tion, the question will be divided into two parts: whether auctions are desirable
at all, or in specified cases.
1. Should Auctions Be Encouraged At All?
The practice of encouraging takeover auctions is the subject of a protracted
debate in the legal literature. Many commentators maintain that auctions will
reduce the number of takeovers because competition raises the winning price,
which lowers bidders' returns and consequently makes them less likely to bid
in the first place.'45 If takeovers are a mechanism for reducing agency costs,
the consequence of auctions is to increase managerial slack, as a decline in bids
translates into a reduction in the market for corporate control's disciplinary
force. While an auction increases the returns from a takeover to a specific target
ex post, it reduces the ex ante probability of a takeover, thereby loosening
external constraints on managers. Shareholders are, accordingly, harmed by
regulations fostering auctions. The agency-cost reduction explanation of take-
overs is central to this position, which concludes that regulatory policy encour-
aging auctions is misguided and undesirable.
Other commentators question the importance of an adverse effect of auc-
tions on the number of takeover bids. In their view, bidders have an alternative
means of recouping their investment (selling the shares they accumulate before
making an offer into the winning bid)'46 and search costs are low (possibly
a result of the role played by financial intermediaries in the bidding process);
consequently, auctions will not reduce the number of initial bids, or any
decrease will be insignificant.47 In addition, if targets search for bidders, then
permitting auctions enhances their incentives to make value-maximizing invest-
144. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989) (auction must be
fair); Grand Metropolitan P.L.C. v. Pillsbury Co., Civ. No. 10319 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 1988) (mandating
poison pill redemption).
145. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role ofa Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161 (1981); Alan Schwartz, Search Theory and the
Tender Offer Auction, 2 L., ECON., & ORG. 229 (1986).
146. The success of this strategy is limited by federal and state restrictions on the number of shares
bidders may accumulate before making a bid. Holders of 5% of a company's stock must disclose their
ownership and intentions within 10 days of the acquisition under the Williams Act, and acquisitions of
blocks of varying sizes trigger state takeover laws' punitive provisions. For a discussion of these statutes,
see infra Part l.C.
147. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and
Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982); Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity
in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982).
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ments in assets (to increase their attractiveness to acquirers) as well as to
provide information to potential bidders. 14  Some have even questioned
whether there are social gains from search. Hirshleifer shows that there can be
inefficient overinvestment in information production (when being "first"
matters, as it does in buying common stock on private information), and
Bebchuk contends that this analysis is applicable to takeovers. 49 Finally,
synergy explanations of takeovers suggest a useful role for auctions: ensuring
that the target is acquired by the highest-valuing bidder (the bidder with the
highest synergy gain from the acquisition). 50 In this case, an auction may
be a cheaper mechanism than a series of resales to move the assets to the
highest-valuing user. 5'
The economic literature cannot readily arbitrate this debate. To do so in a
compelling fashion we would need to know the unknowable-how many
takeovers there would have been had auctions not been permitted. But there
is some suggestive research on the effect of regulations encouraging auctions,
and it tends to support auction opponents. Bidder returns tend to be negative
after state takeover laws were enacted and poison pill defensive tactics
jelled.'52 In addition, firms with active acquisition programs experienced
negative stock price effects upon the enactment of the Williams Act. 53 Fur-
thermore, auctions increase premiums' 54 and the number of auctions and the
size of premiums increased after both the Williams Act and state takeover
statutes were enacted.'55 This suggests that bidders pay more in regimes facil-
itating auctions, which lowers their returns. Hence, these regimes will deter
acquirers from making bids. However, these premium increases may not be due
to the Williams Act. Nathan and O'Keefe suggest that any impact of the Act
148. David D. Haddock, Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and
Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701 (1987).
149. Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity
61 AM. EcoN. REV. 561 (1971); cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers:
A Last (?) Reply, 2 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 253, 261 (1986).
150. Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation, 7 J.L.,
EcON., & ORG. 27 (1991). For an elaboration of this argument, see infra Part II.A.2.
151. Bebchuk, supra note 147; Gilson, supra note 147.
152. Bradley et al., supra note 13.
153. Schipper & Thompson, supra note 12; Schipper & Thompson, supra note 29.
154. Bradley et al., supra note 103; Jarrell, supra note 103.
155. Margaret Guerin-Calvert, Robert H. McGuckin & Frederick R. warren-Boulton, State and Federal
Regulation in the Market for Corporate Control, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 661 (1987); Gregg A. Jarrell &
Michael Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L.
& ECON. 371 (1980). An alternative explanation of these data is that the takeover market changed in the
late 1980s with the emergence of financial bidders (leveraged-buyout investor teams), as opposed to
acquirers who were operating firms, a change that occurred independently of the existence of pro-auction
regulation. These new bidders were willing and able to pay high premiums due to anticipated breakup
values, while the incentives of their financial intermediaries exacerbated any tendency to overpayment, as
fees depended on the value of the deal. I am, however, skeptical of the independence of this explanation
of the temporal trend in bidder returns from the regulatory changes, because any pressure from intermediaries
on bidders to overpay would succeed only if the threat of an auction was likely.
158
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was, at best, delayed, as they find that takeover premiums significantly
increased after 1974 and not after 1968.156 In addition, Franks and Harris find
that takeover premiums increased in the United Kingdom after 1968, which
suggests that the increases Jarrell and Bradley found in the United States after
1968 may not be attributable to the Williams Act.'57
Some studies provide evidence that more directly addresses the effect of
auctions on the incidence of bids. Jarrell and Bradley find that the number of
tender offers declined more sharply after the Williams Act than did the number
of acquisitions.5 8 The comparison is meant to proxy as a control for other
economic variables that affect these transactions. The authors conclude that the
Williams Act has deterred bidders. Unfortunately, they do not appear to have
tested whether the difference in the decline across the two groups is significant,
and they do not indicate what the relative incidence of auctions is for the two
samples. These omissions weaken their conclusion concerning the effect of the
Williams Act.
Hackl and Testani further find that states adopting second generation
takeover statutes had a smaller increase in the number of takeovers than states
with no statutes (controlling for the number of firms incorporated in a
state).'59 This suggests that regulation promoting auctions chills takeovers.
But they also find that bid premiums do not vary significantly across regulating
and non-regulating states, and that regulating states do not experience more
auctions than states without statutes. While the similar level of auction activity
may explain the insignificant difference in premium levels across the two sets
of states, these data imply that the predicted tradeoff of a higher premium for
a reduced probability of takeover is not realized through regulation. 6 ° It is
possible that state takeover statutes do not produce more auctions because
bidders engage in preemptive bidding (they make initial bids at sufficiently high
prices to deter competition) when faced with a potential auction. The equivalent
premium levels across states with and without regulation are consistent with
this possibility, because preemptive bidding need not maximize target reve-
156. Kevin S. Nathan & Terrence B. O'Keefe, The Rise in Takeover Premiums: An Exploratory Study,
23 J. FIN. ECON. 101 (1989).
157. Julian R. Franks & Robert S. Harris, Shareholder Wealth Effects of Corporate Takeovers: The
U.K. Experience 1955-1985, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 225, 238 (1989).
158. Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 155.
159. Jo Watson Hackl & Rosa Anna Testani, Note, Second Generation State Takeover Statutes and
Shareholder Wealth: An Empirical Study, 97 YALE L.J. 1193 (1988).
160. Pound finds that certain antitakeover charter amendments have the same effect: they decrease
the likelihood of a takeover but do not increase the premium paid when a takeover does occur. John Pound,
The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments on Takeover Activity: Some Direct Evidence, 30 J.L. & ECON. 353
(1987).
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nues. 6 1 In any event, a finding of no tradeoff of higher premiums for fewer
bids undercuts the position of auction proponents, because it indicates that a
policy encouraging auctions may not maximize target revenues either ex ante
or ex post.
2. Should Auctions Be Encouraged in Specified Cases?
While we cannot determine conclusively whether auctions should be banned,
we can examine whether, once a bid is made, holding an auction makes more
sense in some circumstances than in others. There is an extensive and highly
sophisticated economic literature analyzing auctions and identifying procedures
which are efficient (i.e., the highest-valuing user obtains the auctioned object)
and which maximize returns to sellers.'62 Cramton and Schwartz apply the
results of this literature to takeover auctions, and emphasize that the optimal
policy is a function of the auction environment.'63 This is a promising approach
because it is questionable whether empirical research will be able to resolve
the more general auction debate in a convincing manner.
There are two prototypical auction environments, common value and
independent values. In a common value auction, the auctioned object's value
is the same to all buyers, whereas in an independent values auction, each buyer
values the object differently. The paradigmatic example of a common value
auction is the sale of an oil lease (any buyer will obtain the same revenue from
the extracted oil), and that of an independent values auction is the sale of an
antique (buyers have different tastes and hence place different values on
possessing the object)."6 Cramton and Schwartz maintain that, while current
policy does not make distinctions, takeover regulation should differ by auction
type because the optimal number of bidders differs contextually: it is desirable
to restrict the number of bidders in the common value context but not in the
independent values case. As they detail, bidders can be induced to enter or stay
out of an auction by judicious use of lockups and breakup fees; the use of these
devices should thus be matched with the auction environment.
161. When bidders are uncertain about the target's value, one bidder's high initial bid may deter others
from investigating the target because they think the first bidder has the highest valuation. If the highest-
valuing bidder is one of those deterred, then the target will not be sold for the highest possible price.
Cramton & Schwartz, supra note 150, at 43. More important, even if the first bidder is the highest-valuing
user, the target can still be sold at a price below its maximum worth. This is because the preemptive bid
can deter the entry of the second highest-valuing bidder, which will result in the first (and highest-valuing)
bidder paying a lower winning price. Id.
162. For a review, see Paul Milgrom, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, 3 J. ECON. PERSP., Summer
1989, at 3.
163. Cramton & Schwartz, supra note 150.
164. In practice, auction environments are not pure. Oil companies' drilling costs may differ, which
creates differences in profitability across buyers, and antiques can be resold, which results in a common
value component. The mixed environment is referred to as a correlated or affiliated auction. See id.
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Different explanations for takeovers mesh with different auction types, and
therefore aid in establishing when different auction rules should be applied. If
a takeover is undertaken to achieve synergy gains, then the auction setting is
one of independent values because the value of the target will vary with the
bidder (different bidders can achieve different levels of synergy gains).'65 In
this context, an auction is appropriate because it permits the target to identify
the highest-valuing bidder. The optimal form of auction differs, however, if the
goal is social efficiency (ensuring the highest-valuing acquirer wins) as opposed
to revenue maximization (ensuring the target gets the highest price for its
shares). 16 6 For example, an auction with a reservation price (the minimum
price the seller requires) extracts rents from the bidder, increasing the target's
share of the takeover gain, but it can also be inefficient. If the reserve price is
above the target's value to the highest-valuing bidder, then the takeover will
be defeated, even though the value of the firm in the bidder's hands is greater
than its value under incumbent management.
If a takeover is, however, explained by agency cost reductions (eliminating
free cash flow or replacing inefficient management), then the auction envi-
ronment is likely to be one of common value because many bidders will be able
to mitigate the problem and each will obtain the same value from the tar-
get. 167 Cramton and Schwartz offer two prescriptions for the common value
setting: (1) target boards should make information available to all bidders; and
(2) target boards should follow English auction procedures. 6 Both of these
practices reduce bidder uncertainty, and therefore raise bids. This is because
bidders in common value auctions will lower their bids in fear of the winner's
curse. Increasing the information available to bidders about the target and
holding an English auction mitigate this problem by reducing uncertainty, which
in turn lowers bidding costs and reduces the likelihood of the winner's curse.
Cramton and Schwartz further contend that running such a common value
auction is undesirable compared to negotiating with one buyer. Assuming
bidding costs are fixed, as the number of bidders increases, a bidder's prob-
ability of winning decreases. To maintain expected revenue, the bidder must
therefore reduce its bid. The target's revenue is equal to its expected value less
the sum of the bidders' costs. The target is consequently better off reducing the
165. Id. at 49.
166. id. at 40.
167. Id. at 47.
168. Id. at 35. An English auction is a multiple-round auction in which the highest bidder wins at the
reservation price of the second highest bidder. Each bid is made publicly, with the bidding continuing until
only one bidder remains. Cramton and Schwartz suggest that their analysis casts a more favorable light
on the RJR Nabisco board's behavior during buyout negotiations: after running a sealed-bid auction, the
board encouraged another round of bids. Id. at 36 n.19, 45 n.32. This made the bidding process closer
to an English auction, the more appropriate procedure for maximizing RJR's revenue in a common value
auction environment.
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number of bidders (not holding an auction), and negotiating with one bid-
der.'69 In addition, this should avoid the winner's curse. Of course, the target
must obtain a higher bid out of the restriction in order to make it worthwhile.
Cramton and Schwartz suggest that the threat of holding an auction if negotia-
tions fail may bolster the target's bargaining position. 7 '
Cramton and Schwartz maintain that proper auction policy depends on the
anticipated behavior of target managers as well as on the auction environment.
Because different environments require different auction policies, the ideal
approach is discretionary: hold an auction when the takeover involves indepen-
dent values but do not when it is a common value situation. However, if target
managers do not act in the shareholders' interest, then a rule granting them
discretion is undesirable, for faithless managers would use this discretion to
defeat bids by holding auctions when they should not, by claiming that a
common value case is an independent values one.'17
Concern over the agency problem leads Cramton and Schwartz to suggest
policy choices determined by a law of averages: choose the approach that is
consistent with most takeovers and eliminate all managerial discretion. They
contend that most takeovers involve common value settings, and therefore
propose a new regulatory approach, an auction ban. This would entail repeal
of the statutes fostering auctions (in particular, the Williams Act's minimum
offer period) and boards' Revlon duties, as well as prohibition of poison pills.
The policy choice also depends on a third variable, the intended goal of regula-
tion. Cramton and Schwartz argue for social efficiency, rather than target
revenue maximization, as the proper goal, which, for common value auctions,
is fostered by an auction ban.'72 If the goal is instead target revenue maximi-
zation, then an auction would be appropriate even in the common value setting
because it would increase revenues compared to an unregulated process in
which bidders direct their offers to dispersed shareholders.'73 However, as
discussed earlier, it is desirable to restrict entry in such an auction.
As Cramton and Schwartz note, their policy proposal, banning auctions, is
tentative because the evidence identifying the prevalent auction environment
169. Id. at 35.
170. Id. at 36. They do not discuss the impact on the success of this strategy of adoption of their
proposed no auction rule, see infra text accompanying note 172, although they do note that acquirers still
paid premiums in tender offers before the enactment of the Williams Act (i.e., before takeover auctions
became common).
171. The Time-Warner-Paramount takeover battle can be interpreted as an example of the same prob-
lem. Time management avoided an auction by merging with Warner. While this behavior (negotiating with
one suitor) would be appropriate in a common value context, this was clearly an independent values setting
because synergy gains were expected from the merging of the complementary entertainment businesses.
Therefore, although an auction was warranted to maximize revenues, management deliberately prevented
an auction from occurring.
172. Cramton & Schwartz, supra note 150, at 45.
173. Id. at 45 n.33.
162
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is "scanty". 174 If most takeovers were independent values auctions, for exam-
ple, then the appropriate policy would be the opposite of what they propose,
a rule of auctions in all cases. I am hesitant to advocate adoption of either
blanket rule, as against a discretionary approach, for three reasons. First,
reading the data most favorably to Cramton and Schwartz, the auction environ-
ment has clearly varied dramatically over time: common value takeovers appear
to be more typical in recent years compared to an earlier era in which conglom-
erate and product-extension mergers (independent values) predominated. 175
Fluidity in takeover environments over time suggests caution in mandating a
blanket rule, for the choice will not always be appropriate and changing the
legal regime is often difficult and always costly.
176
Second, Cramton and Schwartz reject a discretionary approach for fear that
management will be able to hold an auction by the backdoor in common value
cases because while the bidder litigates to prevent an auction, target manage-
ment will gain time to find other suitors (in effect, running an auction).'
This problem, however, can be resolved without banning auctions. Acquirers
could be permitted to recover damages for their search and bidding costs from
the individual manager-defendants upon a court determination that they wrong-
fully held, or tried to hold, an auction. As Cramton and Schwartz note, courts
will be able to determine whether management's conduct was appropriate, as
the economic learning on takeovers can instruct courts on the criteria for
acceptable auction procedures by identifying the auction environment. 7 In
174. Id. at 46.
175. Cramton and Schwartz characterize bust-up takeovers, which dominated the landscape of the
1980s, as common value auctions. In bust-up takeovers, different assets and divisions of the target are sold
to different buyers in related industries. Cramton and Schwartz contend that these takeovers should be
viewed as common value auctions because any bidder can realize the same value by selling the pieces.
The classification is not as clean as they suggest, however, and this muddies up the appropriate policy
choice. Consider the Revlon takeover. The successful bidder, Ronald Perelman, retained the cosmetics
division and sold the health care division to a firm in the same industry. The competing bidder, Forstmann-
Little, would have retained the health care division and sold the cosmetics division. This takeover is a bust-
up takeover (selling pieces created more value than keeping the firm intact) yet clearly, different acquirers'
strategies differed and synergy gains were present. Cramton and Schwartz define the latter condition as
appropriate for an independent values auction, but the former as proper for a common value one. An auction
that combines both components, such as Revlon, is an affiliated auction, an environment in which the
English auction format is optimal. Id. at 44-45. Because I do not think that the Revlon situation is
aberrational, I find troublesome the blanket classification of bust-up takeovers as common value auctions.
This makes the choice of a mandatory rule of no auctions even more problematic.
176. The changing pattern of auction environments is interesting from a political economy perspective
when we consider the timing of takeover regulation facilitating auctions. Managers are the prime movers
behind state regulation. Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 11
(1987). Auctions should have been favored in the earlier years, when acquisitions exhibited independent
values properties, yet the burst of state regulations came to the fore, and indeed accelerated, as-the typical
auction environment changed to one of common value. It is not surprising that laws fostering auctions were
enacted when the environment shifted because in the common value setting, auctions are more likely to
defeat bids, the outcome a faithless management prefers.
177. Cramton & Schwartz, supra note 150, at 46.
178. Id. at 49.
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particular, specific questions can be asked. For example, is free cash flow
present? Are there economies of scale or scope? Are bidder and target stock
returns positively correlated? Has the target been performing so poorly that
management needs to be replaced? While courts will have to obtain information
from the target and acquirer to engage in this inquiry, strategic
behavior-bidders and incumbents providing selective or misleading informa-
tion in the hope of obtaining their preferred auction treatment-will be con-
strained by the litigants' interests being in sharp conflict.
Third, I am skeptical whether corporate law should, as Cramton and
Schwartz maintain, instruct target boards to pursue social efficiency rather than
revenue maximization when presented with a bid. Opting for efficiency rather
than revenue maximization stands a commonsense understanding of property
rights on its head: our economic system is premised on the consensual transfer
of property in private commercial transactions. Yet from a social efficiency
standard, the target shareholders ought to be compelled to sell to any bidder
for a trivial amount above the market price, in order to move the assets to the
higher-valuing user. Most of us--except strict utilitarians' 79-would find such
a rule unacceptable, but it is the logical implication of implementing such a
policy.180
A no auctions policy would impose a social cost, a higher price for equity
capital, as common stock owners would no longer share in takeover gains. If
bidders are public companies, then this would not affect the cost of equity
capital because what shareholders lose on the target side they gain on the bidder
side. '8 However, in the 1980s many bidders, particularly LBO teams, were
privately-held, and therefore the lost premiums would not be offset by gains
on other holdings in a diversified portfolio. 82 Of course, the social gain dis-
cussed in the previous section, increased bidder search for takeover targets,
179. See Alan Schwartz, The Fairness of Tender Offer Prices in Utilitarian Theory, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.
165 (1988).
180. Cf Coffee, supra note 5, at 1165-66.
181. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698
(1982).
182. Neutrality in regulating takeover auctions may not be desirable if investors cannot diversify across
targets and acquirers. This is because a bias in favor of targets compensates for acquirers' ability to obtain
an unequal division of the gain, an ability that is unrelated to the discovery value of the acquirers'
information about the target and its search costs (hence unrelated to the goal of social efficiency), and
derives instead from a peculiar structural problem of the modem corporation: ownership is dispersed among
many shareholders rather than concentrated in a few hands. This structure makes bargaining ineffectual
without auction protection, providing bidders with a windfall compared to what they would receive if they
were negotiating with a sole-owner. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standard for Takeover Policy,
17 J. LEGAL STUD. 197 (1988). However, data on takeovers in France are apparently at odds with this
contention: the premiums paid for private control blocks are substantially lower than those paid in public
tender offers. B. Espen Eckbo & Herwig Langohr, Information Disclosure, Method of Payment, and
Takeover Premiums: Public and Private Tender Offers in France, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 363 (1989). Regrettably,
Eckbo and Langohr do not provide any explanation, institutional or otherwise, for this counterintuitive
finding.
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which would make the efficiency gains from takeovers more likely, must be
balanced against this social cost of banning auctions.
Cramton and Schwartz's pursuit of social efficiency can be harmonized
within a consensual private property framework as an assertion of which regime
shareholders would prefer before a bid is made. Revenue maximization and
social efficiency diverge when the analysis is conditioned on the existence of
a bid, but the two may coincide when the analysis considers the unconditional
effect of auctions on takeovers (whether auctions decrease the number of initial
bids). The desirability of encouraging auctions in specific situations is, there-
fore, not independent of the general question whether to encourage auctions at
all, and the validity of the Cramton and Schwartz policy proposal to ban
auctions ultimately rests on an anti-auction outcome of the global auction
debate.
This recognition highlights the need for a discretionary policy, because the
resolution of that debate is uncertain. It recasts the policy question as whether
shareholders behind a veil of ignorance (that is, prior to knowing that their firm
is the object of a bid) would prefer a lower premium and an increased likeli-
hood of receiving a bid (the "no auctions" policy tradeoff) to a higher premium
accompanied by a reduced probability of a takeover and consequent increase
in management slack (the "auctions always" tradeoff). Rather than mandate
public policy on the basis of speculation concerning shareholder preferences
over these tradeoffs, the most appropriate policy is to permit the parties whose
wealth is at stake, shareholders, to choose whether or not to hold takeover
auctions for their firms.183 Such an approach treats the maintenance of private
property rights as taking precedence over overall social welfare maximization,
and thus, unlike Cramton and Schwartz's proposal, permits shareholders to trade
bids for premiums, rather than requiring maximization of the number of bids.
One mechanism for implementing a policy of shareholder choice is to retain
the Williams Act as the principal auction-promoting rule, with two amendments:
a proviso that requires management to provide equal information to all bidders
(as Cramton and Schwartz endorse for auctions); and another that permits
shareholders to opt out of the Act if they do not want their firms to hold
auctions. To guarantee that shareholders have the final say on whether to run
an auction, all of management's defensive tactics must be subject to shareholder
approval, as in proposed, Article 8 of the European Community's Thirteenth
Council Directive on Takeovers." This proposal is, however, not intended
183. For a discussion of why paternalistic policies (as embodied in mandatory rules) toward sharehold-
ers are inappropriate, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1549, 1556-66 (1989); Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for
Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599 (1989).
184. RONALD J. GILsON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuIsITIONs 450-51 (Supp. 1991).
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to be as limited as the Directive, which covers defensive tactics once a bid has
been made, for such a restriction undermines the policy of shareholder approval
by encouraging managers to undertake preemptive defensive policies so as to
make their firms "takeover-proof." Moreover, state takeover statutes that
encourage auctions would have to be fashioned as opt-in rather than opt-out
regimes, in order to place the auction decision fully in shareholder control.' 85
A more complex, but equally feasible, alternative would be for corporation
codes to provide a menu of charter rules concerning auctions. Each firm's
charter would incorporate an auction rule, just as they now contain provisions
on indemnification, shareholder voting rights, and so forth. Charters could ban
auctions, require auctions, provide managers with the discretion to run auctions,
specify conditions under which managers must run auctions, or let shareholders
run auctions, which could be accomplished by requiring shareholder approval
of poison pill plans and of pill redemptions, or by including sunset provisions
for poison pills (automatic lapsing without periodic shareholder approval).
Under a corporate charter menu approach, the charter amendment process would
have to be loosened from management's control to provide greater shareholder
autonomy: shareholders must have the right to initiate and adopt charter provi-
sions on auctions without management's approval, given concern over agency
problems in the takeover setting.' 86 The crucial issue is the choice of the
default rule. While I do not believe that Cramton and Schwartz's no auction
rule should be the default position, given management's stark conflict of interest
in the takeover setting, the default rule should accord greater shareholder
control over the auction process than does the current regime.
There is some empirical research that supports permitting shareholders to
choose the auction approach, rather than mandating a no auction regime.
Defensive tactics that shareholders approve tend not to have negative stock
price effects compared to those they do not .approve. 87 But there are limits
to a voting system, as not all shareholder-approved charter provisions have
185. This assumes that managers will not hesitate to put a pro-auction charter provision on the agenda,
compared to an anti-auction one. See Romano, supra note 176, at 187.
186. Forty-eight states, including Delaware, require charter amendments to be initiated by the board
(California is the important exception), and most states require amendments to be approved by both the
board and shareholders. LEWIS D. SOLOMON, DONALD E. SCHWARTZ & JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, CORPORA-
TIONS: LAW AND POLICY, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 585 (2d ed. 1988). Because the current regime
permits auctions, midstream charter amendments to similar effect pose no problem with respect to an adverse
affect on shareholder wealth. Appraisal rights for charter reforms that have adverse wealth effects are a
more adequate response to concerns about midstream opportunism than a mandatory regime prohibiting such
changes. See Romano, supra note 183. Midstream opportunism will be a less pressing problem if
shareholders, and not managers, initiate amendments.
187. Compare Scott C. Linn & John J. McConnell, An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of
"Antitakeover" Amendments on Common Stock Prices, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 361 (1983) with Paul H. Malatesta
& Ralph A. Walkling, Poison Pill Securities: Stockholder Wealth, Profitability and Ownership Structure,
20 J. FIN. ECON. 347 (1988).
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positive stock price effects.'88 One explanation for the different stock price
reactions depends on ownership composition. Stock prices react positively to
defensive charter amendments when management's stock ownership is low
(under 10%) and the provision thus improves dispersed shareholders' bargaining
power, and negatively when management's ownership is high and it can thereby
block a bid.'89 We might expect to find, then, under a charter menu approach,
differences in firms' ownership composition mapping into different preferences
over auction rules. Different states would therefore be likely to choose different
auction default rules, depending on their corporate clienteles.
There is a question whether the effect of a charter provision requiring
shareholder approval of poison pill redemptions is any different from one in
which poison pills are banned, such as Cramton and Schwartz's regime. If
shareholders would not tender their shares whenever they would also not
redeem a pill, then the two regimes would be the same. We need to know
whether shareholders can force an auction (upward bid revision), which is the
ostensible purpose of a poison pill, by not tendering into a low bid in the
absence of a pill. If they can, then their right to redeem pills would be unneces-
sary and undesirable since it would add a further layer of expense onto a bid's
consummation. While no data address this question directly, there is some
probative indirect evidence. Shareholders do not appear to be coerced into
accepting low bids. Partial offers at small premiums tend to be rejected, and
when there is competition between an offer for any or all shares and a two-tier
bid, the one with the highest value, as calculated by the blended premium,
wins. 90 In addition, firms without poison pills appear more likely to be the
subject of an auction than firms with such defenses. 9 ' These data are consis-
tent with the view that shareholder redemption of poison pills and a poison pill
ban are equivalent regimes (i.e., shareholders will not be compelled to tender
into low bids, and auctions will still occur, in the absence of poison pills). But
because these findings are from a regime in which auctions are permitted, we
cannot readily extrapolate from them what premiums would look like, or how
shareholders would react, if auctions were prohibited.
Under the corporate charter menu approach to auctions, legislators troubled
by the uncertain equivalency can retain the status quo as the default rule.
188. See, e.g., Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, Shark Repellents and Stock Prices: The Effects
of Antitakeover Amendments Since 1980, 19 J. FIN. EcON. 127 (1987).
189. Victoria B. Mcwilliams, Managerial Share Ownership and the Stock Price Effects of Antitakeover
Amendment Proposals, 45 J. FIN. 1627 (1990). For a model of shareholder voting that is consistent with
these results and critical of rational apathy stories of shareholder voting that produce calls for mandatory
rules rather than shareholder choice, see Romano, supra note 183, at 1608-10.
190. Robert Comment & Gregg A. Janell, Two-Tier and Negotiated Tender Offers: The Imprisonment
of the Free-Riding Shareholder, 19 J. FN. EcON. 283 (1987).
191. Michael Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J. FIN. ECON.
377 (1988).
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Shareholders will simply choose between these, as well as other options on
takeover auctions, and the information necessary to resolve the question will
be obtained from experience developed under different auction regimes. This
flexibility seems particularly apposite given a dynamic auction environment,
in which different rules are appropriate for different contexts.
B. Regulation Restricting Two-Tier Takeovers
Many state takeover laws prevent bidders from making two-tier acquisitions
(a tender offer for control followed by a merger to obtain 100% of the shares)
that are structurally coercive, that is, front-end loaded. In a front-end loaded,
two-tier takeover, the gain is distributed unequally across the two steps to
induce target shareholders to tender in the first step, in which the bidder gains
control. This type of regulation's explicit concern is horizontal equity, ensuring
that all target shareholders receive the same price for their shares. Equal
treatment, which is thought to prevent shareholders from being forced to tender,
is consistent with the corporate law fiduciary principle that requires shareholder
distributions to be pro rata. Examples are fair price, redemption rights, and
business combination freeze statutes.'92 The Williams Act's requirement of
pro rata acceptance of shares in oversubscribed offers indicates a similar
horizontal equity concern.
Concern for horizontal equity is independent of the explanation of takeovers,
and thus evaluation of the efficacy of this regulatory approach need not turn
on whether the premium is due to efficiency gains or wealth transfers. How-
ever, if these statutes deter bids, then the distinction would matter because
efficiency-enhancing, as opposed to purely redistributive, transactions should
presumably be encouraged. We must also consider whether we are simply
confronting the auction debate in a different guise: do shareholders prefer equal
treatment in exchange for a reduced probability of a bid, over unequal treatment
in exchange for a greater chance of a bid? There is some evidence that share-
holder voting on these amendments parallels the likelihood that the investor will
be unequally treated. Institutional investors, who are able to tender quickly and
will thus always participate in a two-tier bid's first step, thereby benefiting from
a front-end loaded bid structure, oppose the amendments.'93 However, it is
not analytically obvious that two-tier bid restrictions will decrease the number
192. The business combination freeze statute also has the effect of making a takeover less likely by
prohibiting the acquirer from taking cash out of the target in a related transaction for a specified number
of years, even at a fair price. This more restrictive feature is the subject of Part t.C, infra.
193. Romano, supra note 176.
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of bids, as they need only redistribute funds among target shareholders rather
than increase premiums. 94
There is very little empirical evidence that statutes restricting two-tier bids
deter takeovers. For example, fair price statutes do not appear to have a nega-
tive stock price effect although other, more restrictive statutes do.'95 In addi-
tion, Hackl and Testani find that fair price statutes have less of a negative
impact on the number of successful takeover bids than other statutes. 196 There
is also evidence suggesting that the threat of front-end loaded two-tier bids is
overstated. Blended premiums in two-tier bids are not significantly different
from the premiums in offers for any and all shares.'97
More important, the voluntary adoption by shareholders of charter amend-
ments with similar effect to these statutes suggests that shareholders may well
desire equal treatment. Fair price charter provisions have insignificant stock
price effects, while other antitakeover amendments produce significant negative
returns.'98 This indicates that investors are, in all likelihood, not troubled by
these restrictions or that these restrictions have no bite concerning a bid's
occurrence or success (explanations that are not mutually exclusive). Because
legislation does not require shareholder approval, whereas a charter amendment
does, I have contended elsewhere that opt-in rather than opt-out takeover
statutes are preferable. 9 9 This approach mutes any concern that managers
lobby for legislation when they anticipate that voluntary shareholder approval
cannot be obtained. But the economic literature does not provide much of a
basis from which to take serious exception to horizontal equity regulation.
194. Grossman and Hart contend that acquirers must be permitted to make front-end loaded two-tier
bids, or otherwise dilute the returns to target shareholders, in order to induce target shareholders to tender
into the bid. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem and the Theory
of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42 (1980). However, Grossman and Hart's theory is not robust. Under
a variety of reasonable conditions, it is not necessary to exclude public shareholders (i.e., to require dilution
in a two-tier bid) for successful takeovers to occur. See Mark Bagnoli & Barton L. Lipman, Successful
Takeovers without Exclusion, 1 REV. FIN. STUD. 89 (1988). Thus, as a matter of theory, these statutes need
not deter bids.
195. Hackl & Testani, supra note 159; Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects
of Second Generation Takeover Legislation, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 291 (1989); Romano, supra note 176; Laurence
Schumann, State Regulation of Takeovers and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of New York's 1985 Takeover
Statutes, 19 RAND J. ECON. 557 (1988).
196. HackI & Testani, supra note 159.
197. Comment & Jarrell, supra note 190.
198. Jarrell & Poulsen, supra note 188.
199. Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709
(1987).
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C. Regulation Restricting Bidders' Ownership Rights
Several second and third generation state takeover laws go much further
than regulating two-tier offers or encouraging auctions, and, by severely
restricting bidders' ownership rights, have the effect of "show-stoppers" (tactics
that kill a bid).2°° Control share acquisition statutes deny bidders' shares
voting rights (or deny bidders the right to purchase shares) without the approval
of all other shareholders. Business combination freeze statutes prohibit bidders
from engaging in related transactions with a target after they gain control, for
a specified number of years, even if the remaining public shareholders approve
of the transaction and a fair price is paid. Disgorgement statutes prevent
unsuccessful bidders from selling their target shares at a profit. These statutes
raise the cost of some takeovers prohibitively, and thus chill some bids. Shares
without voting rights are obviously of no value to acquirers seeking control to
implement their own business plans,2"' highly leveraged buyers need access
to target assets to service the debt that makes their bids possible, and firms may
not make toehold acquisitions, which may be crucial for a takeover's suc-
cess,20 2 when they face a tax at 100%.
Empirical research shows that these statutes have a far more damaging
effect on takeovers than two-tier bid regulation. Hackl and Testani find a
steeper decline in successful takeovers in control share acquisition statute states
than in other states, including those with fair price regulation. 2°3 Stock price
studies also find more significant negative abnormal returns on the enactment
of business combination freeze, control share acquisition and disgorgement
statutes than fair price and other provisions.' Thus, investors assess these
200. The dividing line between "generations" is the statute's popularity before and after the Supreme
Court's CTS decision. For example, control share acquisition and fair price statutes are called second
generation statutes, whereas business combination freeze and disgorgement statutes are considered third
generation statutes. The Exon-Florio amendment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
authorizing broad Presidential review and approval of acquisitions by foreigners fits in this category of
regulation that could stop certain takeovers. It is not discussed in the text because relatively few transactions
have been sent to the President for a decision, and all but two were approved. GILSON, supra note 184,
at 676. The small number of reviewed transactions may evidence that the Act has had a chilling deterrent
effect on foreign investors, or that it has had little impact in practice.
201. Some practitioners contend that control share acquisition statutes are not effective deterrents
because once a bidder announces a proposed acquisition, the target's shares will be acquired by arbitrageurs
who profit if the bid succeeds and who will therefore always vote in favor of the bidder. See Curtis Alva,
Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 907(1990). Revised control share acquisition statutes in Pennsylvania and Ohio remedy this concern by stripping
voting rights from shares acquired after the disclosure of the proposed control share acquisition.
202. Dosoung Choi, Toehold Acquisitions, Shareholder Wealth, and the Market for Corporate Control,
26 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYsIS 391 (1991); cf. John Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of
Shareholder Oversight, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 237 (1988).
203. HackI & Testani, supra note 159.
204. Cf. Karpoff & Malatesta, supra note 195; Schumann, supra note 195; J. Gregory Sidak & Susan
E. Woodward, Corporate Takeovers, the Commerce Clause, and the Efficient Anonymity of Shareholders,
84 Nw. U.L. REV. 1092, 1104 (1990); Samuel H. Szewczyk & George P. Tsetsekos, State Intervention in
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statutes' impact more adversely. Moreover, when firms opted out of the Penn-
sylvania takeover statute, which included the most refined control share acquisi-
tion and disgorgement provisions, they experienced positive abnormal
returns. 25 These data, in conjunction with the evidence that most takeovers
are efficiency-enhancing transactions, indicate that statutes whose effect is to
thwart bids are poor public policy.
It should be noted, however, that managers are able to thwart bids even
without these statutes' assistance, through a number of defensive tactics
approved by courts. It appears that poison pills and defensive charter amend-
ments are, in fact, quite potent substitutes for takeover statutes. Karpoff and
Malatesta find that the stock price effect of takeover laws is significantly
negative for firms without takeover protections, but not for firms with such
defenses. °6
D. Regulation Introducing Non-Shareholder Interests
The most recent state takeover statutes introduce non-shareholder interests
into decisions about takeovers. "Other constituency" statutes require or permit
boards of directors to consider the interests of non-shareholder groups, such as
workers and local communities, in their decision-making process. Some statutes
also require severance pay for workers who are discharged after a takeover.
These statutes make explicit concerns that may motivate legislators when
enacting any takeover regulation, that a takeover will adversely affect the local
labor market. However, the statutes, ironically, protect managers more effect-
ively than workers. Workers have no right to challenge board decisions for
failing to consider their interest, while shareholders' ability to sue managers
successfully for opposing a bid is diminished. There is no severance pay for
plant closings commenced by incumbent management, but a bidder's ability
to reduce costs by layoffs, and hence the value of a takeover, has been reduced.
the Market for Corporate Control: The Case of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 (1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author); Romano, supra note 176. Pugh and Jahera, however, provide only
mixed support for the proposition: they study the enactment of four business combination freeze and control
share acquisition statutes and pick up significant negative returns on only a few of their many event dates.
William N. Pugh & John S. Jahera, State Antitakeover Legislation and Shareholder Wealth, 13 J. FIN. REs.
221 (1990). They also find that Delaware's business freeze statute had no significant impact in Delaware
firms' share prices, although as they note, commentators emphasize that Delaware's statute is less restrictive
than those of other states. John S. Jahera & William Pugh, State Takeover Legislation: The Case of
Delaware, 7 J. L., ECON., & ORG. 410 (1991).
205. Szewczyk & Tsetsekos, supra note 204.
206. Karpoff & Malatesta, supra note 195. Pugh and Jahera report a similar result for only one of
their four portfolios of firms without defenses, but they also did not find significant negative stock price
effects for as many event dates involving statute enactments. Pugh & Jahera, supra note 204. They also
do not find such a result among Delaware firms. Jahera & Pugh, supra note 204.
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Corporate law conventionally instructed boards to consider only the share-
holders' interests (to maximize profit) for good reason. Maximizing equity share
prices provides managers with a clear-cut decision rule, on which all sharehold-
ers agree in a perfectly competitive capital market,2 °7 with the following'
benefits: (1) it allocates resources efficiently and thereby maximizes social
welfare; 208 (2) it maximizes shareholder utility because investors can trade
against the increased share value to fulfill their diverse, preferred consumption
patterns; 09 and (3) it best matches organizational design with incentives because
equity investments, as residual claims, are more vulnerable than other stake-
holders' investments, which can be protected by contract. 210 By rejecting this
stricture and introducing other constituencies' interests into the boardroom, the
statutes create a situation in which there is no longer a coherent decision rule
for managers to follow, as the many constituencies' interests often conflict. This
will result in decisions maximizing managers' utility, because shareholders'
ability to police board decisions has been legally attenuated, and it will thereby
raise the cost of equity capital and impair the market's allocative efficiency.
The economic literature on takeovers also suggests that these statutes are
utterly misguided. As we have seen, the best available data consistently indicate
that takeovers are not a mechanism for transferring wealth from labor to
shareholders. Layoffs are infrequent and when they occur they affect managers
more than production workers, whose jobs are the object of legislators' concern.
The statutes further exacerbate the agency problem that takeovers aim to
mitigate, by reducing management's accountability to shareholders. Enhancing
management's ability to resist a takeover is unlikely to be in the shareholders'
interest, as the overwhelming evidence demonstrates that target shareholders
gain handsomely from a successful bid. Shareholders, correspondingly, appear
to assess these statutes negatively. An event study of one of the earliest versions
of an other constituency statute, Ohio's 1986 takeover statute instructing
managers to consider long-term rather than short-term interests, found the law
had a significantly negative impact.2 ' Further, the subset of firms that opted
207. See Louis Makowski, Competitive Stock Markets, 50 REv. ECON. STUD. 305 (1983). It should
be noted that in a world with uncertainty, profit maximization is properly replaced with equity share price
maximization.
208. See generally HAL R. VARIAN, MICRoEcoNOMIc ANALYSIS 189-249 (2d ed. 1984).
209. RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 384-400, 544-47
(3d ed. 1988).
210. Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197 (1984).
211. Michael Ryngaert & Jeffry M. Netter, Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law,
4 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 373 (1988). Over a longer interval extending beyond the announcement date, the
negative abnormal return is no longer significant. Donald G. Margotta, Thomas P. McWilliams & Victoria
B. McWilliams, An Analysis of the Stock Price Effect of the 1986 Ohio Takeover Legislation, 6 J.L., ECON.,
& ORG. 235 (1990). But if investors are able to understand the legislation's effect upon its introduction,
the shorter event interval is appropriate. Michael Ryngaert & Jeffry Netter, Shareholder Wealth Effects
of the 1986 Ohio Antitakeover Law Revisited: Its Real Effects, 6 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 253 (1990). There
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out of the Pennsylvania statute partially, so as to retain coverage under the other
constituency provision, did not experience significant positive abnormal returns
on the announcement, while those opting out of all of the statute's provisions
did."' Managers may have a similar assessment of these new laws. Pound
finds that firms that did not opt out of Pennsylvania's takeover statute at all
and firms that did not opt out of its other constituency provision have lower
cash flow valuations than firms that opted out of the statute completely, and
may thus be more likely takeover targets.213 In short, the objectives of these
statutes are, like those of the most restrictive takeover statutes, unsupported by
theory or empirical evidence, and therefore unwise public policy.
E. Regulation through the Federal Tax Code
Several efforts were made to discourage takeovers through the federal
income tax laws during the late 1980s.2" 4 Some provisions were directed at
tax benefits accruing to acquisitions (restrictions on the transferability of net
operating losses,215 and repeal of the General Utilities doctrine216), while
others penalized specified defensive tactics (excise taxes on golden para-
chutes,217 and greenmail21 ).
1. Restricting Deductions
The 1986 tax reform act restricted the ability of firms to take net operating
loss deductions. Restricting net operating losses is poor tax policy, violating
the tax goals of equity and efficiency. It favors old and established firms over
new ones, thereby furthering concentration of business and the growth of
unprofitable diversified conglomerate firms; results in the taxation of capital
rather than income; and distorts investment decisions away from risky pro-
jects.219 As Campisano and Romano argue, the optimal policy on losses is
are as yet no event studies of the more recent "other constituency" statutes. Because many of these statutes
were enacted at the same time as other takeover regulations, such as statutes restricting bidders' ownership
rights, it would be difficult to isolate their effects.
212. Szewcyzk & Tsetsekos, supra note 204.
213. Pound, supra note 53, at 13.
214. In addition, the House Ways and Means Committee in 1987 proposed strict restrictions on interest
deductions for debt used to effect a takeover. Researchers have documented a negative stock price reaction
to the proposal, and contend that it contributed substantially to the October 19, 1987 stock market crash.
See Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffry M. Netter, Triggering the 1987 Stock Market Crash: Antitakeover Provisions
in the Proposed House Ways and Means Tax Bill?, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 37 (1989).
215. i.R.C. § 382 (1988).
216. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 (amending I.R.C. §§ 311,336-338, and repealing
I.R.C. § 333).
217. I.R.C. § 280G (1988).
218. I.R.C. § 5881 (1988).
219. Campisano & Romano, supra note 60.
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one of recoupment (a taxpayer receives a refund when it has no income to
offset), and consequently, transferability of losses ought to be encouraged, not
contracted.22 ° In a second-best world, there may be reasons to deviate from
optimal policy, but the takeover literature provides no basis for any divergence.
As already discussed, tax savings from net operating losses are not a significant
factor in acquisitions, and hence, investment decisions on takeovers are not
distorted by the possibility of loss offsets. Accordingly, this tax code revision,
which moves us further from the optimal tax policy for losses, cannot be
justified by concern over tax-driven acquisitions.
Under General Utilities,22" ' corporate distributions of appreciated property
to shareholders and sales of such assets pursuant to a plan of complete liquida-
tion were not subject to the corporate level tax. The acquirer of the assets
thereby achieved a step-up in asset basis without payment of the corporate tax.
The repeal of General Utilities in 1986 eliminated this major loophole in the
double tax regime, which had been criticized by commentators without avail
until its use in hostile takeovers made it a prime target for reform. 2 2 While
the repeal removes tax-free increased depreciation deductions as a motive for
an acquisition, as discussed earlier, this tax benefit was not a significant factor
when it was available, in either mergers or MBOs. Unlike the changes in the
treatment of net operating losses, this reform is arguably sensible tax policy,
for it maintains the integrity of the two-tier tax on corporate income. 23 But
just as in the reform of the net operating loss provisions, the desirability of the
policy repealing General Utilities has no connection with its congressional
inspiration, takeovers.
2. Taxing Defensive Tactics
Two defensive tactics have been singled out for federal tax
penalties-golden 'parachutes and greenmail. Taxing these tactics is ironic
because they are likely to benefit shareholders by increasing the probability of
a takeover. The benefit is rather clear cut regarding golden parachutes; it is
more ambiguous for greenmail.
220. Id.
221. General Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
222. Congressional movement to close loopholes because of anti-takeover sentiment was not an
uncommon practice in the 1980s. For example, Congress restricted the favorable treatment for corporate
shareholders in partial liquidations in the 1982 tax reforms, setting the stage for the General Utilities repeal.
See Martin D. Ginsburg, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions, 38 TAx L. REv. 171 (1983). In addition, numerous
tax bills intended to restrict takeovers were introduced during these years. See Romano, supra note I, at
471-72.
223. Eric S. Shube, Corporate Income or Loss on Distributions of Property: An Analysis of General
Utilities, 12 J. CORP. TAX'N 3, 51-63 (1985).
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Golden parachutes are lucrative severance pay contracts for top management
that are triggered by a control change. Although considered a defensive tac-
tic-they raise the price of a bid because the acquirer is burdened with exces-
sive severance payments-golden parachutes benefit shareholders by aligning
managers' incentives with the shareholders' interest, as managers are financially
rewarded for approving a takeover.2" Shareholders apparently recognize the
beneficial role of golden parachutes: stock prices significantly increase on the
announcement of golden parachute plans.225
Greenmail refers to a target's repurchase, at a premium, of the shares owned
by a hostile bidder. Because the repurchase terminates the takeover, it is viewed
as a defensive tactic. But greenmail has a more positive interpretation as well:
it facilitates an auction (if the greenmailer is not the highest-valuing user of the
target, paying greenmail can result in the target receiving a higher premium
from another bidder), serving as compensation for those who supply valuable
information to the market by identifying a takeover target and hence aiding in
monitoring managers."' The idea is that the second, higher-valuing bidder
will enter only if it knows that the greenmailer is out of the picture so that there
will be no competition to its bid. The firm's stock repurchase accomplishes this,
but it comes at a risk: management must make the payment before it knows
for sure whether a second bidder exists. If it knew there would be no other
bidder it would not want to repurchase the shares, but failing to make the
repurchase ensures that no bidder will emerge.227 Thus, an ex ante efficient
decision to pay greenmail, having a positive net present value, may produce
negative stock returns ex post if no second bidder appears. The difficulty with
this story is distinguishing when greenmail is used by faithful managers, who
hope that the action will produce a better bid, as the models hypothesize, and
when it is used by self-serving managers who are confident that no subsequent
224. See David P. Baron, Tender Offers and Management Resistance, 38 J. FIN. 331 (1983).
225. Richard A. Lambert & David F. Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-Making and
Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. AcCT. & ECON. 179 (1985). However, a possible interpretation of this finding
is that shareholders are not valuing the tactic, but rather revising the stock price in expectation of a takeover,
viewing adoption of a parachute as a signal that management expects a bid to be forthcoming. But because
adoption of some defensive tactics is associated with negative stock price effects, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 229-232, where a signalling story is equally operative, parachutes at worst are perceived as less
harmful by investors than those other strategies.
226. Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95
YALE L.J. 13 (1985); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders'
Interest, 17 RAND J. ECON. 293 (1986). Macey and McChesney maintain that greenmail facilitates an
auction without discouraging the occurrence of other bids, so that the critiques of auctions discussed supra
in Part B.A. 1 are unwarranted in this context. This is because the greenmailer produces valuable information
that reduces other bidders' search and bidding costs. These bidders will consequently not be deterred from
bidding, and the greenmailer is not deterred from investing in search because it is compensated by the share
repurchase. Of course, if a successful bidder purchases the greenmailer's shares, the greenmailer would
be equally well compensated.
227. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 226.
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bid will be forthcoming. 28 The possibility that managers will be unfaithful
renders the effect of greenmail more ambiguous than that of golden parachutes.
Stock price data concerning greenmail is, correspondingly, less straight-
forward than that on golden parachutes. The stock price effects of greenmail.
payments are negative, but when abnormal returns are cumulated from the time
the greenmailer acquired its block through the shares' repurchase, the net effect
is positive. 229 Additional data supporting the favorable interpretation of green-
mail is that firms paying greenmail do not have unusually low probabilities of
experiencing a control change after a repurchase.23° The decline on the repur-
chase appears to be related to information reversal-there will be no takeover
premium as no white knight has emerged-rather than a wealth transfer from
target shareholders to the greenmailer, and hence it is not interpreted as a clear
signal of shareholder harm from, or disapproval of, the tactic.23' In contrast,
the stock price reactions to other defensive tactics, such as poison pills and
defensive restructurings, are negative and not subject to a plausible competing
information-signalling story.232
It is ironic, but not surprising, given the constellation of political interests
in which managers are the moving force behind takeover regulation, 233 that
the defensive tactics that are penalized are those that are more likely to benefit
shareholders rather than the most oppressive defensive tactics. To repeat a by-
now familiar refrain, because the data are consistent with efficiency rather than
expropriation explanations, there is no justification for using the tax code to
discourage takeovers, unless entrenching incumbent management is a bona fide
policy goal. Moreover, if it was desirable to restrict these specific tactics, an
excise tax would not be the preferable approach. An excise tax has little
practical effect on the use of golden parachutes: boards simply pay the man-
agers' excise tax by grossing-up the amount of the parachute to cover the tax.
Nor is an excise tax necessary for eliminating greenmail, because firms can and
do adopt charter amendments that prohibit greenmail payments.
228. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment on Two
Models, 96 YALE L.J. 295 (1986).
229. Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence on Six Controver-
sial Investors, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 555 (1985); Wayne H. Mikkelson & Richard S. Ruback, Targeted Repur-
chases and Common Stock Returns, 22 RAND J. ECON. 544 (1991).
230. Mikkelson & Ruback, supra note 229 (control change in 29% of sample). This is higher than
the unconditional probability of a firm's control change, id., but lower than that accompanying other
defensive tactics, such as litigation, see e.g., Jarrell, supra note 103.
231. Mikkelson & Ruback, supra note 229; Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 226.
232. See Larry Y. Dann & Harry DeAngelo, Corporate Financial Policy and Corporate Control: A
Study of Defensive Adjustments in Asset and Ownership Structure, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 87 (1988); Malatesta
& Walkling, supra note 187; Ryngaert, supra note 191.
233. Romano, supra note 176; Romano, supra note 1.
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F. Regulation by Antitrust Enforcement
The Justice Department revised its Merger Guidelines in the early 1980s,
making fewer related-firm acquisitions subject to antitrust challenges. The more
favorable attitude toward takeovers in antitrust, compared to tax, policy is
explained by the policy's source: the Reagan administration could implement
the change without congressional participation.2" The economic literature
suggests that the policy shift toward more accommodating antitrust enforcement
was beneficial.23 Conglomerate mergers-which were encouraged by antitrust
enforcement in the 1960s-70s-are less profitable than related-firm mer-
gers,236 and the gains from related-firm acquisitions seem to be derived from
operating synergies and cost-cutting rather than increased market power.27
Efforts to reverse policies that are less hostile to acquisitions are therefore
unwarranted.
G. Summary and Conclusion
An informed reading of the economic literature indicates that much of the
takeover regulatory apparatus is misconceived and poor public policy. Table
2 summarizes the evaluation of current takeover regulation. Because the
overwhelming balance of research views takeovers favorably, the more restric-
tive of takeovers, the more ill-conceived the regulation. Consistent with this
assessment, we find that the more restrictive state laws (business combination.
freeze, control share acquisition and disgorgement statutes) have a greater
negative stock price effect than the less restrictive ones (fair price statutes).
Policies intended to aid employees or the fisc (regulation introducing non-
shareholder interests into the takeover decision and regulation by means of the
tax code) simply extract wealth from shareholders and redistribute it to manage-
ment because there is no evidence that takeovers systematically affect labor or
the treasury adversely, while there is evidence of managerial job loss accompa-
nying takeovers. The change in antitrust enforcement policy during the 1980s
appears to have been beneficial rather than a wealth transfer from consumers,
because the data suggest that the source of the gains in the more profitable
234. 1 have argued that the Administration was an important reason why, in the midst of anti-takeover
sentiment and one-sided lobbying, the federal securities laws were not amended to restrict takeovers in the
1980s. Romano, supra note 1, at 489. The difference in attitude between the legislative and executive
branches was due to two factors: President Reagan's free market ideology, and institutional features of the
presidency that make it less vulnerable to the interest group politics that plague Congress.
235. Bhagat et al., supra note 26, at 57; Gregg A. Jarrell, Financial Innovation and Corporate Mergers,
in THE MERGER BOOM 52, 54-55 (Lynn Browne et al. eds., 1987).
236. KAPLAN & WEISBACH, supra note 14; Morck et al., supra note 13.
237. Bhagat et al., supra note 26; Healy et al., supra note 17.
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related-firm acquisitions, which the new enforcement policy permits, are from
operating efficiency improvements and not increased market power.
The most difficult regulation to evaluate is the varied set of rules that have
the effect of promoting takeover auctions. Empirical research cannot decisively
arbitrate the debate on the efficacy of auctions because a conclusive resolution
calls for counterfactual data concerning regulation's impact on the number of
takeovers. What little we can glean from the available data suggests a more
cautious policy toward auctions is in order. First, there is some evidence that
regulation facilitating auctions reduces the frequency of takeovers without
significantly increasing premiums. Second, investors perceive such regulation
as harmful. Third, bidders have fared poorly since regulation fostering auctions
has become common. Finally, auctions may be desirable in selected situations,
depending on the auction environment, which can be identified by the explana-
tion for the takeover. Conditional on a bid's occurrence, where a takeover is
motivated by synergy gains (independent values situation), rather than agency-
cost reduction (common value situation), an auction will be desirable. This
strategy may not be optimal unconditionally; the answer pivots on the more
general debate on auctions. This uncertainty suggests that a discretionary
approach to auctions is best. This is particularly so because the typical auction
environment (and hence the appropriate legal response) changes over time.
Moreover, since managers' and shareholders' interests are in intense conflict
in this context, it is important to fashion legal rules that permit shareholders,
and not managers, to control if and when firms hold takeover auctions.
The common theme from examining the numerous takeover regulations is
that economic learning and regulatory policy on takeovers have, for the most
part, not marched in step. Policy has been founded on unsubstantiated fears and
suspicions about the impact of takeovers on third parties, which are raised by
managers and their lobbying organizations, who view corporate governance as
one more arena for pork barrel politics.
The level of takeover activity has slowed in the 1990s. The collapse of the
junk bond market and the corresponding credit crunch, caused by banking and
financial services sector weakness and new government policies restricting
financial institutions' holdings of high yield debt, surely contributed to the
decline in takeovers. To the extent that government policy toward financial
market regulation is premised on a negative perception of the economic impact
of takeovers, this article suggests that the policy is profoundly misguided. Of
course, if the concern is that certain 'institutions, such as lenders whose deposits
the government insures, should not invest in high yield corporate bonds, that
is a different question, which is beyond the focus of this article. But the long-
term solution to such a concern surely is not the evisceration or destruction of
the market for corporate control. Whatever the cause, the current respite from
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the frantic pace of dealmaking in the 1980s does offer an opportunity to reflect
deliberately on the policy ramifications of takeover regulation, as the more
potent political pressures are in abeyance. Hopefully, this will lead to a policy
realignment in which the regulatory regime comes to mesh with what we know
about takeovers.
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Table 2
Evaluation of Takeover Regulation
Form of Regulation Assessment
1. Regulation Encouraging Auctions
(Williams Act; Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act; first generation
takeover statues; Revlon fidu-
ciary duties)
2. Regulation Restricting Two-Tier
Bids
(Fair-price and other similar
second generation statutes)
3. Regulation Restricting Bidder
Ownership Rights
(Business combination freeze,







5. Regulation through Federal Tax
Code
(Restrictions on carryover of net
operating losses; imposition of
corporate level tax on asset
basis step-up; excise taxes on
greenmail and golden
parachutes)





While empirical research is inconclu-
sive, caution warranted: premiums
higher in auctions; takeovers decrease
after regulation but in some cases
premiums do not increase; negative
stock price effect of regulation.
Little impact: insignificant stock price
effect of regulation and voluntary
counterparts (charter amendments);
blended premium in two-tier bids no
different from any-or-all bid
premiums.
Unwarranted: more negative stock
price effect and steeper decline in
takeovers after this regulation than
other regulation.
Unwarranted: negative stock price
effect; no evidence of other
constituents being harmed by
takeovers; important social benefits
from board considering solely
shareholder interests.
Policy issues unrelated to takeovers
and excise taxes ill-conceived: no
evidence of takeovers being driven by
loss carryovers or asset basis step-ups;
shareholders may benefit from golden
parachutes and greenmail.
Beneficial: related acquisitions more
profitable than unrelated, but gains
appear to be from asset productivity
and operating efficiency improvements
and not increased market power.
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